Notes

See, for example, Buddhism and Ecology, ed. by Martine Batchelor and Kerry Brown (London: Cassell, 1992); Dharma Gaia: A Harvest of Essays in Buddhism and Ecology, ed. by Allan Hunt Badiner (Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1990), Practice of the Wild by Gary Snyder (San Francisc North Point Press, 1990), Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought, ed. by J .B. Callicott and R. T. Ames (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1989), and "D gen, deep ecology, and the ecological self" by Deane Curtin (Environmental Ethics, 16.2, Summer, 1994, pp. 195-213).
Actually, to suggest that there are "non-dual" forms of Buddhism in contrast to "dualistic" forms is a misnomer. All forms of Buddhism are non-dualistic in that Enlightenment is understood ultimately to transcend all ontological duality. Similarly all Buddhist schools unavoidably adopt, in some form or another, an "operational dualism" reflected in the very distinction between delusion and Enlightenment. There is a significant difference of emphasis in the way different schools speak of Enlightenment and its relation to the state of suffering, but it is likely that this reflects more a difference of practical approach than of substantial ontological divergence. The difference between the gradualists and subitists within the tradition is thus best seen, in my view, as largely rhetorical, though part of the point, of course, is precisely that we often become trapped within the language we use.
The history of Buddhist views on whether plants and non-animate things have ethical standing is quite complex; see Lambert Schmithausen's The Problem of Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism (Toky Int. Institute of Buddhist Studies, 1991) and also William LaFleur's "saigy and the buddhist value of nature, parts i and ii," (History of Religions, 13:2&3, pp. 93-128 and 227-248).
SN XII, 3, §23.
This is true at least of historical Zen, even if not of some of the modern-day versions of 'Zen' promulgated in the west.
There is a logical and historical line linking the early doctrines of dependent co-arising (pratiitya-samutpaada), impermanence (anitya), and the non-substantiality of the self (anaatman) with the later Mahaayaana notions of emptiness and interrelatedness, but tracing those links adequately would require more space than is available here.
Practice of the Wild, p. 91.
My distinction between the hierarchy of oppression and the hierarchy of compassion is inspired in part by a similar distinction between the "power mode" and the "love mode" suggested by the Ven. Sangharakshita in "mind-reactive and creative" (The Middle Way, Aug., 1971). In Sangharakshita's distinction, however, the positive sense of empowerment (i.e., spiritual or ethical power) that I wish to stress here is not as evident.
Cf. Geoffrey B. Frasz's "environmental virtue ethics: a new direction for environmental ethics," (Environmental Ethics 15.3, pp. 259-74).
Dharma Gaia, p. 53-63.
Ibid, p. 62.
'Saantideva provides a traditional Buddhist parallel to Naess's notion of "enlightened self-interest" (ibid.) when he points out that the hand helps the foot (by removing a thorn) even though the pain of the foot is not a pain of the hand; see the Bodhicaryaavataara, 8:91-99.

Alan Sponberg (Dharmachari Saaramati) is Professor of Asian Philosophy and Religion.

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