As to the first question, there can be no doubt that Zen Buddhists have traditionally shown a lack of significant reflection and action upon social problems. Christopher Ives notes in this regard that:

Historically, monastic Zen has not studied, analyzed, or responded self-critically to the full range of suffering in the social world. This lack of critical spirit has contributed to problematic support of the status quo, whether the aristocracy, samurai dictators, militarists, or certain large corporations.(4)

Even Abe is quick to admit that in the past there has been a tendency on the part of Buddhists to adopt an "apathetic attitude toward social evil."(5) There are no doubt numerous factors for this historical deficiency on the part of Buddhism, including the monastic focus mentioned in the above quote by Ives and perhaps even the very cultural adaptability that has been characteristic of Buddhism's mode of transmission. That is, as Winston King points out, the accommodating nature of Buddhism to diverse cultural contexts "has led it to accept the dominant forms of social organization in the countries it has penetrated."(6) Perhaps this can best be seen in the present historical context, where in the West Buddhism has often been adopted as an individualistic and therapeutic response to the pressures of modern society. Thus, once again, Buddhism comes to be seen as a form of escapism from the larger social world; a means of leaving the problems of social reality behind rather than an attempt to work constructively within society. The above comments are not meant to suggest that historically no individual Buddhists or Buddhist communities have been involved in concrete social reform; certainly there are numerous examples of such socially engaged Buddhists.(7) Rather, I merely wish to point out that both Buddhists and non-Buddhists have perceived a deficiency on the part of Buddhism to offer sustained and systematic reflection on and articulation of a concrete social ethics.

However, as the thrust of this paper is philosophical and not historical I will not dwell on the issue of the historical dimension of the claims concerning Buddhism and social critique. Much more important is the question as to whether, given the essential doctrines of Zen Buddhism, it is theoretically possible for Buddhism to develop in such directions. That is, it might be the case that historically Buddhism has lacked any clearly formulated social ethic, and yet still contain the inner conceptual resources to formulate such analyses. The second kind of charge against Buddhism is more foundational as it concerns the very conceptual coherency of the idea of a Buddhist social ethic. Lee Stauffer, who is careful to distinguish between the two sorts of claims, thus argues against the possibility of any kind of Zen ethics based on its doctrine of nondiscrimination.(8) And we will see that the second sorts of criticisms of Zen are best seen as based on the claim that one or another of a few basic Buddhist concepts are such that they make the development of any substantial social philosophy impossible. Therefore, in the remainder of this section I will examine some criticisms that have been voiced concerning several key Buddhist doctrines in regard to their compatibility with the possibility of social critique. In doing so, the following remarks are by no means intended to be anything like an exhaustive treatment of the operative concepts, as I will explicate them only in relation to the criticisms that have been leveled against them.

One such concept within the Buddhist framework that has been seen as inimical to the development of social critique is the notion of karma. Abe remarks that "karma means act or deed" and is primarily to be understood as "mental activity oriented by volition."(9) The basic Buddhist idea is that each such act has further consequences for the individual based on the motives, disposition and character of the person who committed that act as well as the circumstances in which it was performed. The cumulative consequences are such that the karmic effect of one's own actions determines one's future. Thus, following Padmasiri De Silva we can think of karma as a type of "moral causation" in which a person's future fate is determined on the basis of their past moral actions.(10) In even simpler terms, DṬ. Suzuki states that "the principle of karma is `whatever a man sows that he also reaps' and this governs the whole life of the Buddhist."(11) We have then a core Buddhist notion that is essentially a moral notion, concerning the ethical status of one's actions and the consequences that such actions have upon one's life.

However, despite the fact that the traditional Buddhist notion of karma is essentially a moral concept concerning the effects of one's ethical behavior, its applicability to social ethics is mitigated by several factors. First, by thinking of karma as a type of causation in which an individual's present state is determined by their past moral actions, there is an obvious tendency to think of the present condition of persons, including their present social condition, as being the necessary result of their own previous actions. One introductory Zen Buddhist text thus states that "all states and conditions in this life are the direct result of previous actions and each action in the present determines the fate of the future."(12) Similarly, Winston King states as the rule of karma: