relationship  between  the  thesis  (pak.sa) and the
　　   justification  (hetu) is  always  expressed  in  the
　　   Sanskrit  ablative  case and that this  relationship
　　   cannot be represented  or translated  as the English
　　   "therefore"  (or  ergo).  Its  best  translation  is
　　   "because."   Thus,  for   the  incompatibilist,  the
　　   primary objection  to identifying  the Nyaaya scheme
　　   as a deductive  inference  is the  familiar  one  of
　　   ordinary   language  philosophers   who  resist  the
　　   translation  of expressions as `q because p' into `p
　　   ) q' on the  grounds  that  the causal or explanatory
　　   meaning　　 of　　 "because"　　 is   lost　　 in   the
　　   truth-functional conditional.

　　　　  This   objection   has  force,  but   one   must
　　   distinguish　　 between　　 the　　 assertion　　 that
　　   truth-functional connectives preserve or capture the
　　   meaning   of  `q  because  p'  and  the  claim  that
　　   truth-functional   connectives   can   represent   a
　　   deductive relationship  between propositions  within
　　   the  Nyaaya  scheme.  It  is the  latter  which  the
　　   received  view upholds: it is the former  which  the
　　   incompatibilist vehemently opposes. The issue is not
　　   joined, because  surely one can maintain  that there
　　   is a deductive  inference  in the  inversion  Nyaaya
　　   scheme  without  maintaining  that  it captures  the
　　   meaning  of or even  approaches  synonymy  with  the
　　   original.  In sum, the issue  between  the  received
　　   view and the incompatibilist  pivots on the former's
　　   willingness to invert the Nyaaya form and read it as
　　   a valid deduction  and the latter's insistence  that
　　   the form cannot be so reversed  without  losing  the
　　   special relationship  of the hetu.  Given the merits
　　   of both views and given the fact that both positions
　　   are  not explicit  contradictories  of one  another,
　　   there is a way to understand the Nyaaya scheme which
　　   allows both sides to have their cake and eat it too.
　　   I believe  that  the three-membered  Nyaaya  is best
　　   understood   as   a   retroductivc   inference.　　 A
　　   retroduction, as  it has  been  described  by C.  S.
　　   Peirce and

　　　　　　　　　　　　  P.185

　　   Norwood  Hansonl  is a pattern  of  reasoning  which
　　   leads  from  some  phenomenon  or perception  to  an