The French Indologist Rene Guenon pointed out
that after the appearance of the Nyaaya Suutra,
there were two abridged forms of the five-membered
syllogism, (10) in which either the first three
[15-17] or the last three [17-19] parts appeared
alone. Gutnon also pointed out that the latter
abridgment resembles the syllogism of Aristolle; the
former abridgment, of course, is precisely the one
found in the 6th century Nyaayaprave`sa and indeed
the same smoke-fire example occurs there also. Given
the interpretation I have offered, it is not
surprising that there should be two abridgments of
the five-membered syllogism. One abridgment captures
the retroductive move; the second captures the
deductive move. Deduction and retroduction are
inversions of one another, and they can be separated
by positioning the property-locus statement. One
abridgment reasons from the thesis statement to an
explanatory generalization; the other abridgment
deduces the thesis from the generalization. The
Buddhist logicians Mere quite emphatic about which
abridgment they favored. The Nyaaya quite explicitly
says, "We say that these three statements make the
members of the syllogism and no more! "(11)
Tachikwa's gloss on this statement indicates that it
is an assertion that only three statements are
necessary for an inference.
We may conclude that what "inference" primarily
meant to the Buddhist logicians was "reasoning to an
explanatory causal hypothesis"; however, it would be
wrong to further conclude that they had no
appreciation of the
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deductive abridgment. To them logic was a means of
bringing others to a recognition of particular
statements; it was an upaaya, a heuristic teaching
device. The retroductive abridgment of the
five-membered syllogism clearly teaches in the sence
that it brings the hearer to an awareness of a causal
or conceptual connection. The deductive abridgment