Nevertheless there is a perfectly legitimate function for Buddhist metaphysics, although it is subject to certain provisos. It must be constructed in such a way that it is helpful in freeing us from attachment and, in accordance with the principles of the nonsubstantiality of all things, their impermanence and conditionality. In so helping us it will not and cannot describe or give us a picture of the world as seen by a buddha, but it can point to the experience of a

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4. Cf. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, 2d ed. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), pp. 44-45.

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buddha. Such schemes give us an account in terms of basic constituents or the interrelatedness of things of such a kind that it would be impossible or even conceptually absurd to be attached to them. We are apt to become attached to our own pictures or constructions, which we make from such accounts, and when this happens we are victims of illusion. So we can say that any Buddhist metaphysic contains an inbuilt correction against dogmatic attachment to it: like a kind of medicine that carries with it an antidote against addiction.

　　 From a conventional point of view such a metaphysic may be regarded as true, and certainly every effort will be made to provide something which can be so regarded. But this kind of truth applies only to conceptual constructions, and its importance lies in the fact that it enhances the scheme's utility for helping people. In short, its function is basically therapeutic, and the motive involved is compassion. One is not guilty of dogmatism even if one does regard such a scheme as true, for one can see through it, so to speak -- see that it is only a mere set of conceptual constructions and see that it points to what is really important. It is the kind of thing to which it would be absurd to be attached, so one is free to take it up or put it down according to circumstances. Buddhism has often been described as antimetaphysical, but this is a serious oversimplification. It all depends on what we have in mind by metaphysics.

　　 Wittgenstein was not antimetaphysical either, at least not in the way that it has often been supposed. He has no project such as the elimination of metaphysics nor has he any intention of reducing metaphysical propositions to nonsense. When doing Wittgensteinian philosophy, metaphysical assertions are at first typically puzzling. Then we are able to see that a feature of such propositions is that they obliterate the distinction between empirical and conceptual inquiries. [5] They then take on the aspect of nonsense. But at a deeper level of analysis we realize that they are illuminating because they help to give us a clear view of the logical or philosophical grammar of important terms in our language. It is because we lack such a view that so many of our philosophical troubles arise. [6] The metaphysical assertions remain quite undisturbed or unaltered for now we can see that they are quite all right as they stand. Our angle of vision of them has changed. This situation calls to mind a Zen master's characterization of what happens in Zen practice. "Before you study Zen, mountains are mountains and rivers are rivers; while you are studying it, mountains are no longer mountains and rivers are no longer rivers; but once you have Enlightenment, mountains are once again mountains and rivers are rivers." [7] Despite the obvious difference between the philosophical practice of

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5. Cf. Wittgenstein, Zettel trans. C. E. M. Anscombe, ed. C. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), para. 458.

6. Cf. Philosophical Investigations, trans. C. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), para. 122.

7. D. T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of Suzuki, ed. William Barrett (New York: Doubleday, 1956), pp. xvi-xvii.

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Wittgenstein and Zen meditation there is an intriguing parallel between the steps taken to enlightenment or understanding in each.

　　 When Wittgenstein speaks of bringing metaphysical terms back to their uses in everyday language, [8] he does not do so from any spirit of hostility to metaphysics but because he wishes to show how they illuminate the deeper logical grammar of our language. This consists of rules analogous to "A sphere has no length" or "A rod must have length," and rules of course are not descriptions. But with metaphysical assertions we get what could be described as proposals to alter some of the basic grammar. It is this which makes them illuminating and, even at this deeper level of analysis, can give them a paradoxical look; although once we can see what is going on they lose this. But as far as this kind of view is concerned there is, to my knowledge, no parallel in Buddhist thought.