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Wittgenstein and Zen Buddhism(4)

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9. Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books 1st ed., ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), p. 59.

10. Philosophical Investigations, para. 401.

11. Cf. ibid., paras. 132 and 133.

 

 

p. 476

   Because of his obvious interest in ordinary language and its connection with our perplexities, a lot of people seem to think that Wittgenstein was mainly concerned with a therapy of language. He is not concerned, however, with linguistic pathology and some type of surgical reconstruction of language, but with people -- the users of language -- and with some of the special features of the instrument they use when they use language. These are the features which are of special interest to philosophers, since lack of proper appreciation of them is an important cause of our philosophical troubles. There is nothing wrong with natural language; there is not even anything wrong with metaphysical language; the trouble lies in us: in our lack of knowledge and insight into what we are doing when we use language. Consequently he says: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it." [12] Of course he did not mean that philosophy may not affect our own personal use of language, for instance, by giving it greater clarity, but he did not see the task of philosophy, as he wanted to do it, as the introduction of linguistic reforms which substitute supposedly more precise and refined forms for ordinary language. He wanted to help the users to reform themselves. This, of course, is a far cry from the position of various contemporary purveyors of formal linguistic programs and systems who are eagerly contributing their mite to the process of fitting us for the dawning automated and computerized society.

   From a Zen point of view there is nothing wrong with the forms of ordinary experience nor with the forms of life which make up ordinary existence. There is not even anything wrong with conceptual thinking and with metaphysics. The trouble lies in us. There is no program of substituting some special supermundane experience for ordinary experience nor some special type of holy life for ordinary everyday life. But after the kind of insight which can occur in Zen practice, although in a sense everything is left as it is, the person is different because his angle of vision has changed. Ordinary experience is now the experience of a bodhisattva and our ordinary life is the holy life. Here again, even though one might say that Wittgenstein and the Zen Buddhists are obviously talking about different things, there is an interesting similarity of attitude and approach to them. In connection with this, Wittgenstein emphasized that language was inescapably connected with life and with experience. "... the speaking of a language is part of an activity, or a form of life." [13] "... for is what is linguistic not an experience?" [14]

   Wittgenstein tells us that philosophical problems have depth: that "they are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language


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12. Ibid., para. 124.

13. Ibid., para. 23.

14. Ibid., para. 649.

 

 

p. 477

and their significance is as great as the importance of our language." [15] I think that Zen Buddhists would agree with the first statement and would also agree with Wittgenstein's characterization of philosophy as a battle against the bewitchment of the intelligence by words, but they would not regard the second statement as adequate. We want a heart that is not bewitched, not merely an intelligence. The roots of our problems are certainly deep, but the depth differs from that of our linguistic forms and is proportional to the depth of our ego-centeredness.

   Zen methods enable us to reach down or out through thought and language, as normally used, to quite a different level or kind of experience. Language can still be used here, of course, but not as it is normally used in everyday life and science; for example, as any reading of Zen literature quickly shows, and certainly not in a way appropriate to a more linguistic type of therapy of the users of language in a philosophical context. In order to help us reach out through thought and language and appreciate the different type of task or problem with which we are faced, certain more intellectual and philosophical moves are sometimes made as preliminary steps. It is here that Fann's remark about the well-known ability of Zen masters to show the nonsensical character of metaphysical questions and assertions applies. The swift ironic and sometimes humorous demolition of such questions and assertions serves to remind us that thinking of this type is out of place. The use of more philosophical comments as reminders calls to mind one of Wittgenstein's characterizations of philosophy as "assembling reminders for a certain purpose." [16] But although the general function is the same, the more special function is different for philosophical comments are used to remind us of different things. Wittgenstein keeps trying to bring us back from abstractions to what is concrete and familiar, but which we are apt to overlook when we are doing philosophy; and he keeps reminding us of these things and of what people do and do not merely say in familiar everyday situations. This should not be taken to mean that he gives what is familiar and everyday a special status at the expense of what is unusual or strange but that he uses one to illuminate the other. Obviously this cannot be done unless one can see what is before one's eyes or under one's nose all the time.