Vijnapti in the Yogacara context is the manifested fruition (vipaka) of
traces of past karmic activity (vasana) in the constructed form
(parikalpita) of an apparently new experience. Thus our entire network of
perceptions is perpetually conditioned by our own past choices and actions.
The responses that we make to these 'new' experiences themselves condition
the nature of future experiences through the establishment of karmic traits
(vasana) deposited in the store-consciousness (alayavijnana). Vijnapti for
the Yogacara then is not simply the `cognitive-representation of
sense-objects' (vijnaptir visayasya, Trimsika v.2), as is usually
understood by the term, but is more fundamentally a representation of the
agent's own subliminal karmic predispositions (anusaya). In other words, in
the Yogacara system vijnapti comes to be seen as a direct reflection of
one's own state of mind [24].

This point can be further illustrated by an examination of the cognitive
process as outlined in Asanga's Bodhisttva-bhumi. Asanga attempts to
explain in this text the manner in which our cognition of samsara is
perpetuated. Accordingly, Asanga argues that the 'pure given-ness'
(vastu-matra) of perception is conceptualised (vikaltyate) in sensory
apprehension resulting in the construction of an objective-support
(alambana) for consciousness. Attachment to these objective-supports (as
independently existing entities) perpetuates our experience of samsara
through the appropriation of karman in the form of habitual, subconscious
forces (samskaras). This position is not as unique doctrinally as some have
suggested. In a Buddhist context the doctrine of karman necessitates an
acceptance of the view that experience is conditioned in some fundamental
sense by the seeds of past actions. What is distinctive about the Yogacara
account of the dynamics of karman is the refusal to extend the discussion
beyond a purely phenomenological account of karmic appropriation.

Whether Asanga's explanation of the processes of cognition leads to a form
of idealism is certainly an interesting question. However, for the
Buddhist, as for the believer in karman in general, the important point is
the realisation that the objective world which confronts us is, or at least
was at some stage in its manifestation, a product of our own intentional
actions (karman). This is a central Buddhist idea, expounded for instance
in Abhidharmakosa-bhasya IV.1:

It is said that the world in its variety arises from action (karma). It is
because of the latent dispositions (anusaya) that actions accumulate
(upacita), but without the latent dispositions [they] are not capable of
giving rise to a new existence. Thus, the latent dispositions should be
known as the root of existence (mulam bhava) [25].

The Yogacara notion of vijnaptimatrata is an attempt to reformulate this
basic Buddhist insight through a comprehensive phenomenological analysis of
the activities of the mind. Vijnapti therefore refers, not just to the
immediate cognitive-representation of an object in one's mind, but also,
more fundamentally, to the representation of those subliminal forces
(samskara) which have caused such an object to be presented to
consciousness in the first place. In taking this stance the Yogacarin is
not thereby committed to a form of subjective idealism since it is
abundantly clear that we do not simply imagine the world of external
objects that confronts us here and now. Nevertheless, the Yogacarin argues,
our experiences are still causally dependent upon the traces (vasana) of
past karmic activity.

One should note then that the early Yogacara position at least seems to
involve an acceptance that our experience has a certain pre-determined
aspect to it. The world that we perceive is not simply `imagined' since we
can neither wish it away arbitrarily nor transform it into something else
at the slightest whim. Nevertheless, for the Yogacarin the world that we
experience is fundamentally the product of our past karmic actions and our
reactions to it will determine whether future circumstances will continue
to confront us in a similar manner. The world then is not `real' in the
sense of containing objective and independent entities (parikalpita), but
is real in the limited sense of being a really existing (though causally
inter-dependent) flow of perceptions (paratantrastita). This realm is
`dependent' insofar as our experiences are dependent upon past karman.

So, the Yogacarin might wish to say something like the following. The world
of our experience is actually `there,' if not in the form of a
subject-object dichotomy which exists independently of our experience of
it. We experience a certain pre-given reality (vastu-matra) in sensory
experiences but these are in actual fact a stream of interdependent sensory
impressions dependent for their appearance upon the consciousness which is