(vijnaptimatra/cittamatra) eventually subverts the notion of
`representation' itself, since one realises that no truly external object
can be presented to consciousness. Thus, Madhayanta-vibhaga I.6 states
that,

Depending upon perception, there arises non-perception, and depending upon
non-perception, there arises non-perception [28].

To which Vasubandhu explains,

Depending upon the apprehension that there are only
cognitive-representations (vijnaptimatra), there arises the
non-apprehension of things. Depending upon the non-apprehension of things,
there arises the non-apprehension of cognitive-representation-only as well.

So even the notion of vijnaptimatrata is to be relinquished at the highest
levels of attainment. This statement alone suggests that it would be
extremely misleading to take either `vijnapti' or `vijnana' as designations
of an ultimate reality in the early Yogacara literature (as enshrined in
the doctrinal epithets `Vijnaptimatrata' and `Vijnanavada' which are often
used by scholars as alternative nomenclatures for the Yogacara school)
since both notions are relinquished in nirvikalpa-jnana. One cannot even
rely upon the notion of alayavijnana for solace in this regard. In the
Yogacarabhumisastra Asanga discusses the cessation of the alayavijnana
[29]. Again in Mahayanasamgraha I.61.3, Asanga declares that the
alayavijnana is `like maya, like a mirage, like a dream and an optical
illusion'; as such, it is `the seed for the imagination of the non-existent
(abhutaparikalpa)' [30]. As we have already noted Vasubandhu (the
Yogacarin) also seems to have accepted that the alayavijnana is little more
than a metaphorical concept (upacara) [31]. This in itself follows on from
the Sautrantika designation of the `seed' (bija) metaphor as a nominal
existent (prajnapti-sat) [32]. The Madhayanta-vibhaga also seems to argue
that consciousness is something which is eventually relinquished. Thus, I.3
states that,

Consciousness arises with the appearance of objects, sentient beings, self
and Cognitive-Representations. Nothing exists as its object, therefore that
[object] being absent that [consciousness] too is non-existent [33].

To which Vasubandhu adds in his commentary,

As material form etc. [consciousness] appears as objects, and as the five
sense-organs, it appears as sentient beings. These five senses refer to
one's own as well as other consciousness-streams. The appearance as a self
is the defiled mind (klistam manah), since it is associated with
self-delusion. Cognitive-representations (vijnapti) appear as the sixfold
consciousness. 'Nothing exists as its object' because the appearances of
objects and sentient beings are without a fixed image; and because the
appearances of self and cognitive-representations are false appearances.
Thus, 'because of that [object] being absent, that [consciousness] also is
non-existent'. That is the four kinds of graspables--form, etc., the five
sense-organs, mind, and the sixfold consciousness, are absent. On account
of the graspables being absent, the grasping consciousness also is
non-existent [34].

Thus, upon closer analysis, there is much evidence which questions some of
the central assumptions of a straightforwardly idealistic interpretation of
Asanga and Vasubandhu. Certainly one cannot hope to cling onto the concept
of consciousness-only (citta-matra) or representation-only (vijnapti-matra)
as evidence of subjective idealism in the early Yogacara. In the highest
states of attainment both the mind and cognitive-representations (vijnapti)
are to be relinquished, 'external objects' being relinquished at a much
earlier stage.

Perhaps by drawing attention to the continuities of thought between
pre-Mahayana and early Mahayana Abhidharma thought in India one can gain a
much greater appreciation of the philosophical context of early Yogacara
thought. Clearly, interpreting early Yogacara through the eyes of later
commentators can greatly enhance the comprehension of Indian Mahayana
thought. At times, however, ignoring later controversies and focusing upon
the philosophical and conceptual continuities to be found in the incipient
stages of a particular school of thought can bring to light new insights in
our understanding of that school. If we examine the early literature of the
Yogacara the possibility emerges that long established interpretations of
the school by Buddhist and non-Buddhist commentators and even subsequent
developments within the school itself do not exhaust the hermeneutical
options, ambiguities and alternate avenues that could have been followed as
the school evolved. The early Yogacara literature provides many interesting
avenues for future exploration and development and these have by no means
been fully explored or exhausted by contemporary western scholarship on the
subject. It may yet prove to be the case that many of the long cherished