We shall now briefly touch upon the question of the relationship between fundamental ethicoreligious insights and the metaphysical systems invented in their support. In the history of Indian thought, as perhaps also in the histories of other cultural systems, moral and other types of value intuitions preceded the formulation of rational metaphysical systems. One consequence of this sequential relation between insight and its metaphysical rationalization is the fact that the same sets of values are likely to be recommended by and be deducible from diverse philosophical world-views produced by a single cultural system. Confining ourselves to the Indian cultural scene, we find several virtues and some aspects of spiritual discipline being stressed alike by systems of thought orthodox and heterodox, theistic, atheistic, and absolutistic.
We shall now attempt to identify the more essential and significant ethicoreligious insights of the Indian cultural system taken in its entirety. There is a bewildering profusion of concepts relating to various phases and facets, particularly of religious life, invented and elaborated by different religio-philosophical systems. We shall here specifically comment on only two important concepts of the Indian ethicoreligious thought, that is, the concepts of ahiṁsā (noninjury) and anāsakti (detachment).
Early Vedic religion enjoined animal sacrifice for propitiating gods. However, soon after the rise of the Vaiṣṇava current of thought in Āgamic works and the epics, ahiṁsā became one of the cardinal principles of Hindu morality. It was later incorporated in Hindu ethics by some philosophical schools, for example, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, During and after the Middle Ages. the teaching of ahiṁsā was strengthened by different schools of Vaiṣṇava Vedanta. As the representative of the Smṛti tradition, the Advaita Vedanta was not doctrinally committed to the ethics of total ahiṁsā, but the rising tide of Vaiṣṇavism prevented it from recommending animal sacrifice and the taking of meat to the three varṇas including the Ksatriyas. On the contrary, under the influence of other philosophical schools, it chose to ignore the controversy regarding animal sacrifices enjoined by the Vedas; it gradually came to confine itself to explicating the essentials of spiritual discipline for the attainment of liberation.
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Here it may be noted that a type of monistic philosophy, not associated with the doctrine of māyā, had been popular with the Hindus from the time of Upaniṣads onward, if not from the still earlier period when some of the "Sūktas (for example, the Purusa Sūkta and the Hymn of Nonexistence) of the Ṛgveda had been composed. The monistic Upaniṣadic philosophy, with its emphasis on ahiṁsā interpreted both as noninjury to living beings and as the extension of compassion and service to them, became the foundation of Hindu ethics particularly at the hands of the Vaiṣṇava interpreters of the Vedāntic tradition. Thus in the Viṣṇu Purāna, Prahlāda, the great devotee of Viṣṇu, is found making a number of statements of the following type: Knowing that god Viṣṇu is present in all creatures—since neither the totality of living beings, nor myself, nor the food is other than Viṣṇu — I serve all creatures with food; may this food bring them satisfaction. [9] Elsewhere, in the same text, we read: We offer obeisance to that unborn, imperishable Brahman which is present in our and others bodies and in everything else, there being nothing other than it anywhere. [10] This teaching of the ethics of universal love and service does not make any explicit reference to the transcendence of temporal order in the state of mokṣa. We shall return to this point later.
The ethics of ahiṁsā probably originated in and was nourished by the Śramaṇa orders. As is well known, ahiṁsā occupies the most important place in the moral and religious teaching of Jainism. The basis of the teaching is stated to lie in the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. "Since all the creatures desire life and have aversion to death, therefore, one should avoid taking life." A number of Jaina works treat ahiṁsā at length. The Praśna-vyākarana-Sūnra enumerates thirty names and twenty-two forms of himsā; quite a number of concepts occurring in them are common to both. The names and forms refer mostly to the psychological accompaniments and consequences of himsā. To illustrate: it is called breach of faith or perfidy (aviśrambha); that which is unworthy to do (akṛtya); death (mṛtyii); that which inspires fear or terror (bhayaṅkarā); destructive of the essential virtues of the soul (guṇānam virādhanā), and the like. Under forms, among others, the following are mentioned: that which is practiced by petty persons (kṣudra)', that which involves callousness toward other living creatures (nirapekṣa);