could be described without such contradiction” (Moore, 1978:106). This
contradiction is expressed in the Isa Upanishad:
That One, though never stirring, is swifter than thought …
Though standing still, it overtakes those who are running …
It stirs and it stirs not.
It is far, and likewise near.
It is inside all this, and it is outside all this.
It is a paradoxical and contradictory statement. N2g2rjuna applied
the eightfold negations to approach the ultimate truth by refuting his
non-proposition.
Not arising, not passing away;
Not eternal, not terminable;
Not one, not many;
Not coming, not going;
I pay homage to the Buddha,
The foremost among teachers,
Who has taught this dependent co-arising
In order to graciously to uproot all fabrication.
(Nagao, 1989:10)
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Kalupahana refers to this approach as the ‘dialectical negative
approach’ in the Buddhist Philosophy. In the M^lamadhyamakak2rik2m,
N2g2rjuna formulated the central teaching of the Buddha as follows:
sarva8 tathya8 na v2 tathya8 tathya8 c2tathyam eva ca,
naiv2tathyam naiva tathya8 etat duddh2nu$sna8.
“Everything is such, not such, both such and not such, and
neither such and not such: this is the Buddha's admonition”
(Kalupahana, 1986:269).
Frits Staal formulates this short passage (catu4ko%i) in the following
form: “(1) x exists, (2) x does not exist, (3) x exists and does not exist,
(4) x neither exists nor does not exist” (Staal, 1975:36). If we follow
this formula, we have to accept that “x exists and does not exist” at
the same time. As Stall and Murti have mentioned, these four formulas
would violate ‘the principle of noncontradiction’ which prevents us from
rejecting and accepting the same statement at the same time (Staal,
1975:37; Murti, 1955:146-148).
Richard Robinson has interpreted N2g2rjuna's formula in
alternative ways as follows: (1) All x is A, (2) No x is A, (3) Some x is
A, and some x is not A, (4) No x is A, and no x is not A (Robinson,
1978:57). Staal insists that Robinson and other scholars' logical attempts
to interpret this formula is unsatisfactory by their failure between “the
principle of noncontradiction (‘not both A and not-A’) on the one hand,
and the two principles of the excluded middle (‘either A or not-A’) on
the other (the two latter principles are equivalent)” (Staal, 1975:38).
Staal considers that the catu4ko%i shows N2g2rjuna's adherence to
an ancient Indian tradition which rejects the validity of the words. In
the M^lamadhyamakak2rik2m (18.7), N2g2rjuna advocated the limitation of
the words as follows:
Niv#ttam abhidh2tavyam nivrtte citta-gocare,
anutpann2niruddh2 hi nirv2!am iva dharmat2.
“When the sphere of thought has ceased, that which is to be
designated also has ceased. Like freedom, the nature of things
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256
is non-arisen and non-ceased” (Kalupahana, 1986:268).
Staal translates the first line of this sloka as “What words can
express comes to a stop when the domain of the mind comes to a
stop.” He interprets N2g2rjuna's thought as to “express the view that
one knows that certain things cannot be expressed and cannot be
known” (Staal, 1975:45). This is paradoxical in at least one sense. The
M2dhyamikans felt such difficulties and interpreted their doctrine in
different ways. In this particular sloka, Staal seems to interpret
N2g2rjuna's view as negative.
N2g2rjuna's view of words should be distinguished from the
Nihilistic view which rejects any validity of words. Although N2g2rjuna
admitted the limits of words, he utilized the sequential negations of
words as his logic of paradox without propounding any propositions
(pratijn2) (Staal, 1975:44). N2g2rjuna said, “I have no proposition (n2sti
mama pratijn2)” (Bhattacharya, 1971:237). Although N2g2rjuna insisted his
non-proposition, paradoxically, non-proposition is another type of
proposition. Continuous negations of negations is the way to avoid any
misconceptualization in the definitions of words.
It seems that N2g2rjuna kept his own proposition without standing
to either side of the secular propositions, such as Nihilism or
Positivism, as the reasons for the Buddha's silence are examined.6
However, there is no other means to explain ultimate or conventional
truths without using words with logical reasoning, or other symbolic
expressions; otherwise, one should keep silent. Therefore, Nagao agreed
to the position of the Pr2sa9ghika who “speak by using conventional
language and reason with the logic of the mundane world for the
simple reason that there is no other means by which the Great
Compassion can manifest itself” (Nagao, 1991:47).
Although the Buddhist scriptures describe the aspects of the
limitation of words or misleading aspects, it seems that they do not
negate the valuable aspect of words and logical reasoning. In the