As for the law of excluded middle, Wittgenstein did not attack it. He did say that we were sometimes tempted to invoke it when it conceals more than it reveals, such as when we might say: "Either it's five o'clock on the sun or it's not," or "Either the stove's in pain or it's not." [13] The primary issue in these examples is what it could possibly mean to say that it's five o'clock on the sun or the stove is in

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pain. The exact meaning of Streng's sentence about the excluded middle is unclear, but he does go on to say that Wittgenstein's position "also denies that the metaphysical problem of relating the 'one' essence to the 'many' forms is important for learning about the nature of reality." [14] The philosopher Plotinus believed that he had an experience of union with the One and he was concerned about how to describe the relation of the One to the many. Are we to suppose that Wittgenstein would have said that such concerns were not important "for learning about the nature of reality"? To my knowledge, the later Wittgenstein nowhere says or suggests anything of the sort. Augustine was heavily influenced by Plotinus and neo-Platonism is his theology, and Wittgenstein told Malcom that he had prefaced the investigations with a quotation from Augustine because the conception expressed there "must be important if so great a mind held it." [15] Wittgenstein believed that he had developed a new perspective on philosophy, but he did not thereby suggest that either his own earlier work or the work of the great philosophers before him was unimportant "for learning about the nature of reality." I do not believe, furthermore, that he ever addressed the issue of necessary requirements "for an integrated world view." I suppose he might have said that a world view should make sense, but the variety of ways in which that is possible just about excludes any meaningful general discussion of "necessary requirements" (or even unnecessary requirements).

　　 Streng believes that Wittgenstein, like Naagaarjuna, would not accept the views of the function of words found in the mythical and intuitive structures of religious apprehension. In the mythical structure, "because certain words have the power to bring forth the ultimately real, they are regarded as having exclusive intrinsic value over against other words." [16] If a Hindu believes that chanting "Om" is a particularly revealing and meaningful practice which is far superior to chanting "Wesley" or "peanut butter, " what philosophical basis would Wittgenstein have for rejecting this idea? Wittgenstein was concerned about the use of language, and chants have a clear use in religious life. So the meaning of such practices is not an issue. Of course, Wittgenstein may not personally believe the Hindu or any other religious view, but that is a far different matter from his taking issue with the notion that "the stove is in pain" is a meaningful statement. A similar objection can be made regarding Wittgenstein and the intuitive structure which holds that "no expression is adequate to bear the fullness of reality which must be finally known by a non-symbolical means: intuition." [17] Wittgenstein has no philosophical basis for denying such a belief. It may not be a belief that he personally holds, but on the other hand he was an admirer of Augustine, George Fox, Tolstoy, and Kierkegaard, and it is highly unlikely that any of them would take issue with the intuitive structure as stated above. There are indeed philosophers-logical positivists and certain anthropologists, among others -- who have taken it upon themselves to relieve their "inferiors" of the notion that their religious beliefs make sense, but Wittgenstein was about as far

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removed from such views as one can get. The swollen-headedness and vanity of such a position was appalling to him. Note his remarks on Sir James Frazer's Golden Bough:

What narrowness of spiritual life in Frazer! Hence: how impossible for him to comprehend a life different from the English life of his time.
Frazer cannot imagine a priest who is not basically an English parson of our time, with all his stupidity and vapidness. [18]

　　 Streng holds that there is a third structure of religious apprehension, the dialectical, which is Naagaarjuna's: he "denies that all words gain their meaning by referring to something outside of the language system...; the relationship between words in a statement... [is] only of practical value and not indicative of ontological status." [19] But if this is Naagaarjuna's view it is not Wittgenstein's, as we can see from the preceding remarks. Streng is mistaken both in attributing the "dialectical" position to Wittgenstein and in saying that he would deny the mythical and intuitive structures of meaning. Naagaarjuna may be correct in his religious beliefs; Wittgenstein would have regarded himself as being in not much of a position to say anything about that. But if Naagaarjuna held the philosophical ideas which Streng attributes to him, Wittgenstein would have contradicted him.