And:

Every sentence in our language "is in order as it is." That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal, as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us....

　　 Here it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up--to see that we must stick to the subjects of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties.... We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider's web with our fingers. [60]

Furthermore, if one is going to formalize a philosophical discussion, there has to be agreement both on the symbolism and on what is to be formalized. But the satisfaction of the latter condition makes otiose the project of formalization. Waldo's comparison of Wittgenstein and Naagaarjuna is unsuccessful both in detail and in overall approach.

IV
I wish to conclude with some remarks about what I call "Naagaarjuna's paradox," namely, the fact that the results of his efforts -- more Buddhist scholasticism -- were contrary to his purpose, which I take to be reducing, if not eliminating, the arid scholasticism of dharmapravicaya. [61] In order to understand the paradox, we need first of all to have a clear idea of Naagaarjuna's overall teaching in the Kaarikaas. For our purposes, I think this teaching may be represented by the following theses.

1. It is dependent co-arising that we term emptiness; this is a designation overlaid [on emptiness]; it alone is the Middle Path. (MK 24: 18) [62]

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2. "Not caused by something else," "peaceful," "not elaborated by discursive thought," "Indeterminate, " "undifferentiated": such are the characteristics of true reality (tattva). (MK 18:9)

3. The self-existence of the "fully completed" [being] is the self-existence of the world. The "fully completed" [being] is without self-existence and the world is without self-existence. (MK 22: 16)

4. To him, possessing compassion, who taught the real dharma for the destruction of all views -- to him, Gautama, I humbly offer reverence. (MK 27:30)

5. When the sphere of thought has ceased, the nameable ceases; Dharma-nature is like nirvana, unarising and unceasing. (MK 18:7)

　　 Before commenting briefly on how I understand these theses, it is necessary to note that a substantial shift in content has taken place in the transition from the consideration of "private language" arguments to reflections on the teachings of a great Buddhist aacaarya, for that is how tradition has conceived Naagaarjuna. [63] To have a firm grasp of the realities indicated by terms such as "sensation," "mental states," "language," and "game" is one thing; to thoroughly understand the realities signified by "nirvaa.na," "bodhi," and "tathaagata" is quite another matter. A blind man can, indeed, comment on the judgments of a sighted person; but he is foolish if he does not even attempt to note his necessary limitations. "The crab digs its hole to the size of its shell." [64] It is well to have a healthy respect for the "emptiness" of our own judgments in this kind of a case if nowhere else.

　　 I understand, then, Naagaarjuna to be saying that there is the basic fact of relativity or dependent co-arising which we, at least initially, experience as "a single mass of sorrows" (MK 26: 9). But reality is in fact peaceful and undifferentiated, even "blissful." [65] Peaceful reality and the mass of sorrows are not different. Absurdities follow whenever the attempt is made to describe reality with any sort of dualistic concept -- whether philosophical or ordinary -- and therefore such attempts are rejected in principle as being both logically contradictory and ultimately useless for the great work of liberation. Liberation can occur when "the sphere of thought has ceased" in meditation [66] and the Dharma-nature is understood as reality -- the reality of oneself and everything else. By this account, concepts themselves -- both ordinary ones and their philosophical elaborations -- "cover" reality [67] and are powerless to liberate. As for the paradoxical nature of this teaching which destroys all views, one needs to note that there are "two truths" (MK 24:8), the higher and the lower, and one needs to keep in mind which level is under discussion.

　　 Now, as Waldo has correctly suggested, [68] there is something Tractarian about all this. According to the Tractatus one cannot say what the logical form of all sentences is (since that would require another sentence and a sentence cannot picture itself), [69] nor can there be propositions about ethics, aesthetics, or religion: "Propositions can express nothing that is higher." [70] It must be noted that

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"there are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical." [71] We must go beyond the propositions of the Tractatus. "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence." [72] Likewise, Naagaarjuna would have us grasp things which cannot be attained by conceptualization.