p. 449

A number of congruences can and have been found to exist between the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and Buddhist thought. The present series of articles is made possible only because of these congruences and the great potential for philosophic cross-fertilization which they suggest. One of the points, however, at which congruence seems to disappear is the basic one of the validity of speculative philosophy itself, particularly when the Maadhyamika form of Mahaayaana Buddhism is considered. Both the Maadhyamikas and the closely related Praj~naapaaramitaa [Perfection of insight] [1] tradition -- both here referred to as Praj~naa Buddhism [2] -- are characterized by a thoroughgoing program of invalidating conceptual thought: the former through the use of logical paradox, and the latter through what might be called rhetorical paradox. [3] Conceptual thought of any kind is relegated by Praj~naa Buddhism to the level of "conventional truth" (sa^mv.rtisatya), which is essentially delusive or false when seen from the standpoint of "ultimate truth" (paramaarthasatya).

　　 On the other hand Whitehead's program is premised on the inherent validity of conceptual thought:

Speculative Philosophy is the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted. [4]

The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought; and the starting point for thought is the analytic observation of components of this experience. [5]

That we fail to find in experience any elements intrinsically incapable of exhibition as examples of general theory, is the hope of rationalism... It is the faith which forms the motive for the pursuit of all sciences alike, including metaphysics. [6]

The bases of success in the imaginative construction of an adequate metaphysical system are, first, its derivation as "generalization of particular factors discerned" in the rich variety of human experience, [7] and second, its "unflinching pursuit of the two rationalistic ideals, coherence and logical perfection." [8]

　　 We are talking then, apparently, about two diametrically opposed programs of endeavor, one as antiintellectual as the other is intellectual. When we look more deeply at both of these, however, there seems to me to be two routes to follow in seeking a connection between such a speculative metaphysical philosophy as Whitehead's and Praj~naa Buddhism. One of these routes is to examine the notion of relative validity of systems of thought on the level of Buddhist "conventional truth." The other is to explore the strikingly non-dualistic language of the Praj~naapaaramitaa Suutras, specifically that of the A.s.tasaahasrikaa Praj~naapaaramitaa [The perfection of insight in eight thousand lines]. [9]

p. 450

II
Naagaarjuna's basic statements in chapter 24 of the Madhyamakakaarikaas regarding the status of conventional truth are well known: The teaching of the Dharma rests on the two truths, that of the world's convention (lokasa^mv.rtisatya) and what is truth ultimately (paramaarthata.h). Although there is a profound distinction (vibhaaga) between the two, the ultimate truth, and hence nirvaa.na, cannot be attained without resorting to that other truth based on common usage ("transaction": vyavahaara). [10] Naagaarjuna proceeds to show that the conventional doctrines of Buddhism (the Four Aryan Truths, Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha) as well as all commonsense truths (that doers do things, things come to be and pass away, etc.) are, in fact, logically validated only by means of the principle of dependent origination or emptiness: [11] "Everything holds (fits with, is logically consistent with: yujyate) for that for which emptiness holds; nothing holds for that for which emptiness does not hold." [12] The coherency of transactional truth turns out to be founded upon the premise of correlativity. But this very coherency is itself ultimately undermined by the same premise when it is systematically applied to the separate concepts which transactional truth depends upon. They are ultimately not to be depended upon simply because they are "empty" fabrications of the depending (upaadaana) mind. These fabrications are the discriminations (vikalpa: is/is not, permanent/impermanent, bondage/release, sa^msaara/nirvaa.na, not empty/empty, etc.) which are the conceptual and verbal proliferation (prapa~nca) which sustains the painful affliction (kle`sa) of the depending mind. [13] The doctrine of emptiness was provided by the Buddhas as a remedy for all views, [14] including emptiness itself: "Neither 'empty' should be said, nor 'not empty', nor 'both' nor 'neither' -- but they are said [anyway] for the sake of designation (praj~napti). [15] Thus all transactional truth (vyavahaarasatya), valid as such owing to its correlativity, is invalid from the ultimate standpoint of nirvaa.na or enlightenment -- and it is the essential premise of transactional truth, dependent origination, which provides the means by which transactional truth is transcended.