19. MA, pp. 102f. In translations from the MA, the presumed original Sanskrit terms are given where the correspondences with the Tibetan are reasonably clear.

20. MA, pp. 104f.

21. MA, p. 105.

22. Prasannapadaa, pp. 68 f.

23. MA, p. 109.

24. Prasannapadaa, p. 493.

25. MA, pp. 107f.

26. MA, p. 111: de kho na ~nid bsam pa la 'phags pa rnams kho no tshad ma yin.

27. MA, pp. 112f.

28. Cf. Prasannapadaa, p. 57.

29. Prasannapadaa. p. 75. Here Candrakiirti defines the pramaa.nas of transactional truth to be the three mentioned earlier plus upamaana, analogy. It should be noted that for Candrakiirti direct

p. 463

perception, pratyak.sa, is not divided into real and illusory perception -- it is simply perception of whatever appears:

Therefore in the world whether it is [called] a definable object (lak.sya), unique particular (svalak.sa.na), or general characteristic (saamaanyalak.sa.na) -- all of it is evident (aparok.sa) because of its being directly apprehended; hence perception (pratyak.sa) is determined by its object (vi.saya) together with cognition (j~naana). Although a double moon and other [illusions] are not perception in relation to the cognition of one free from ophthalmia, they are indeed perception in relation to one having ophthalmia.

30. Prasannapadaa, p. 57.

31. Ratnaavalii 1.60.

32. I leave aside consideration here of the other school of Maadhyamika, the Svaatantrika. Their foremost representative, Bhaavaviveka, was vigorously criticized by Candrakiirti in his Prasannapadaa (chapter 1) for advocating independent logical arguments which were in accord with ultimate truth, rather than simply allowing opponents' arguments to annihilate themselves. See Y. Kajiyama, "Bhaavaviveka and the Praasa^ngika School," in Nava-Nalanda-Mahaavihaara Research Publication, vol. 1 (Nalanda, 1957), pp. 289-331.

33. AP, p. 305.

34. AP, p. 281.

35. AP, p. 274.

36. AP, p. 177.

37. AP, p. 492.

38. AP, p. 15.

39. AP, p. 190.

40. AP, p. 162.

41. AP, p. 475.

42. AP, p. 356.

43. AP, p. 483; compare also p. 358.

44. AP, p. 347.

45. AP, p. 200.

46. AP, p. 30.

47. AP, p. 219.

48. AP, p. 13 (condensed).

49. AP, pp. 34f.

50. AP, pp. 37f.

51. AP, p. 38.

52. AP, pp. 40f; compare MK 25.24.

53. AP, p. 177.

54. AP, p. 271.

55. AP, pp. 350f.

56. AP, p. 46.

57. AP, p. 175.

58. AP, pp. 175f; compare pp. 525f.

59. Conversely, it might be said that connectedness and lack of tranquility are aspects of the attached mode of knowing as well as of the world as conceptually fabricated: subjectively connectedness would mean dependency (upaadaana), while objectively it would mean dependent origination (pratiityasamutpaada); subjectively lack of tranquility would mean suffering (du.hkha) and objectively, perhaps, impermanence (anityataa).

60. AP, 294f; compare p. 275; note also p. 206: "This is the perfection of non-attachment (asa^nga) because all dharmas are without attachment."

61. AP, pp. 205f. All dharmas are like space -- empty; on the other hand, suffering, caused by attachment and perpetuated by the formations (sa^mskaara), pervades all dharmas -- that is, "everything is suffering." This is a hyperparadoxic variation on the basic pattern here.

62. AP, pp. 257, 259.

63. AP, p. 196.

64. AP, p. 197.

65. AP, p. 301.

p. 464

66. AP, pp. 476f. In this same vein it is said that each of the five bundles is itself both empty and the boundless real nature of all dharmas: a notion which already points to the Avata^msaka doctrine of the interpenetration of all things (AP, pp. 478f.).

67. PR, p. 254.

68. It could equally well be said that the subject is only constituted by (or as) the perceptions of the objects.

69. Alfred North Whitehead, Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1959), p. 9; hereafter cited as Symbolism.

70. For example, PR, p. 35.

71. Taking the Buddhist position I would include "mental" perceptions, that is, memories, images, thought patterns, etc. -- as all of these are presentations for contemplative awareness. Phenomenologically considered these would all show the same spatial extension that is so important a component of Whitehead's analysis of presentational immediacy in general.

72. Symbolism, pp. 21 f.

73. PR, p. 105.

74. PR, p. 133.

75. PR, p. 188.

76. Symbolism, p. 6.

77. Symbolism, p. 24; PR, p. 99.

78. PR, p. 274.

79. Symbolism, pp. 19, 59.

80. Prasannapadaa, pp. 350f., commenting on MK 18.4ff.

81. Symbolism, pp. 73f.

82. Prasannapadaa, pp. 350f.

83. Here I am thinking of the two aavara.na or obstructions, kle`saavara.na (the obstruction constituted by addictive greed, anger, and delusion) and j~neyaavara.na (cognitive obstruction).

84. He remarks at MA, 108f, that conventional truth, "because of the activity of the ignorance characterized by the cognitive obstruction alone (and free of kle`saavara.na), appears to the Aryas [who are within] the realm of appearance (aabhaasagocara)" -- but the full enlightenment of the buddhas involves the elimination of the cognitive obstruction and hence conventionality does not appear to them.