Although Naagaarjuna does not explicitly specify what the valid standards (pramaa.na) of transactional truth are, [16] it can easily be shown that he makes use of at least the three pramaa.nas of direct perception (pratyak.sa), inference (anumaana), and authoritative tradition (aagama) throughout his writings. This is most clearly shown in chapter 24 of the Madhyamakakaarikaas, where inference is used to show a logical coherence between the concept of dependent origination, conventional Buddhist doctrine (that is, aagama), and conventional common-sense perceptions and inferences regarding the world. Conventional Buddhist doctrine is thus seen to be reasonable, and conventional common-sense notions can be reasonable too. But truth for Naagaarjuna is ultimately a pragmatic concept: "Truth is in reality not what has issued forth without contradiction

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from [the mouth of] a sentient being: truth is solely what is for the welfare of others (paraikaantahita). Its opposite is falsity, because of its being detrimental (ahitatva)." [17] Hence the truth-value of what is transactional is simply its effectiveness as a means (upaaya) to nirvaa.na. But the effectiveness of transactional truth is inseparable from its rational coherence, and as Naagaarjuna shows, it is this very rational coherence which dialectically puts transactional concepts to rest (upa`sama). In this sense the real truth-value of transaction is its inherent falsifiability. It is this fundamentally paradoxic standpoint which, of course, seems to give little encouragement to any program of speculative philosophy.

III
Candrakiirti (7th century), [18] representing the Praasa^ngika school of the Maadhyamikas, stoutly maintains the principle of discontinuity between the two levels of truth: conventional truth leads beyond itself only by virtue of the fact that its conceptual-linguistic components dissolve into incoherency when scrutinized by means of the very premise of coherency, dependent origination.

　　 For Candrakiirti all things (bhaava) bear a twofold nature (svaruupa or svabhaava). One of these is constituted by that which is the object (vi.saya) of right vision (samyagdar`sana) and the other by that which is the object of false vision (m.r.saadar`sana) of those whose intellectual eye (blo'i mig) is completely covered by ignorance. [19] The latter -- the false vision of conventional truth -- is indeed valid, according to the world, if it is the perceived object (graahya) of what the world considers the six sense-faculties to be when these are free of impairment by sickness, drugs, spells, deceptive stimuli (such as echoes, reflections, mirages), etc. The sixth faculty, mind (manas), is subject not only to the malfunctions of the other five, with whose perceptions it must deal, but also to the damage caused by the doctrinal systems and views (siddhaantaadi) presented by those who are "not right" (ya^n dag pa ma yin pa) as well as by fallacious reasoning (anumaanaabhaasa). [20]

　　 Candrakiirti says that what is imagined (kalpita), based upon illusion or mirage, as well as what is imagined by non-Buddhist theorizers (tiirthika) are both nonexistent from the world's point of view. Theory -- such as the three-gu.na theory of the Saa^mkhya -- is classed with illusory appearances because those who engage in it, although they do "desire to gain access to reality, they desire to reach that supreme point through correct determination of the true [nature] of the birth, destruction, and so on, of things which are recognized even by ignorant persons such as cowherds and women." [21] There is no way to get closer to reality by improving upon ordinary conventional truth. The only thing such theorizers arrive at, according to Candrakiirti, is a terrible fall into "the ravine of bad views." And he advises even the Buddhist theorizer (in the present case a logician of the school of Dignaaga): "Let this conventional [truth] be! It exists as embodiment beset by error alone. [Yet] it is the cause of

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accumulation of wholesome roots which lead to release for those who desire it -- up until their discovery of reality (tattvaadhigama)." [22]

　　 The ultimate truth cannot be put into words (anabhilaapya) and is not an object of knowledge (na j~naanavi.saya) -- it is to be personally experienced (svasa^mvedya): [23] "In that ultimate how could there be any activity of words or of knowledge (j~naana) For that ultimate is without conditions apart [from itself] (aparapratyaya), quieted, to be personally experienced (pratyaatmavedya) by Aryas, transcending all concept-proliferation. It cannot be taught, nor can it be known (na j~naayate)." [24] Hence where ultimate reality is concerned "the Aryas [25] themselves are the pramaa.na." [26]

　　 Thus there can be no real conflict between the world's truth and the ultimate truth; conflict with the world can arise only when one denies something which is recognized as valid by the world. [27] When the Maadhyamika denies the validity of the concepts recognized by the world, he does so not merely because he speaks from the ultimate standpoint, but also because he is out to show that the invalidity of those concepts derives from the very nature of conventional truth, that is, its dependent origination, and thus the procedure of dialectic refutation is really an exercise of transactional truth based upon recognized conventions of logic (anumaana) and ordinary perception (pratyak.sa). [28] The target of refutation is made up of the concepts both of the everyday world as well as those of Buddhist teaching -- in other words, the pramaa.na of authoritative tradition or scripture (aagama) is included within the realm of conventional truth. [29]