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Freedom, as it has been propounded in the rich variety of theories to be found in Western philosophy, has seldom been conceived as an achieved quality of a person. In this article I would like to demonstrate that "freedom" can best be understood in this manner and that one of the most interesting expressions of this view may be found in the work of the Japanese "critic" Zeamia (1363-1443), the "founder" of the aesthetics of the traditional Nohb drama. Freedom, in his view―as I will reconstruct it―admits of degrees; and moreover, since it is an achieved quality, it announces a qualitative dimension of action.
　

I
　

Western thinking about the nature of freedom has. it seems, two basic loci or concerns which are often closely interrelated: (1) freedom as necessary for morality, and (2) freedom as the opposite of causal determination.

　　 Aristotle, for example, says that the investigation of freedom is concerned with "studying the nature of virtue ... [and] the assignments both of honours and of punishments." ' According to Aristotle, a person is judged to be "free," when, at the time of the execution of his action, the "moving principle" is recognized to be located within himself. This "moving principle" is a power endowed within the agent, derived either from his rationality or his passions. In the matter of moral judgments, it is necessary to clearly distinguish whether or not a person is morally responsible. This either/or attitude is enunciated in Aristotle's distinction between "the voluntary" and "the involuntary." He writes:

Since that which is done under compulsion or by reason of ignorance is involuntary, the voluntary would seem to be that which the moving principle is in the agent himself, he being aware of the particular circumstance of the action.2

Aristotle understood "compulsory" action to mean that "the cause is in the external circumstance and the agent contributes nothing."3 Moreover, he refrained from considering a person "acting by reason of ignorance"' to be free, since such a person does not know "what he is doing."4 Therefore, to judge a person to be free, according to Aristotle's theory, a person who acts must be aware of his actions and that the "moving principle" must be located within himself, whether or not such a principle is derived from his rationality or passions.

　　 If the notion of moral responsibility was, and remains for many still, as the backbone of any meaningful theory of freedom, it is understandable why, as the advent of natural science made its impact felt upon philosophical science,
　

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the issue of freedom came to be discussed vis à vis causal necessity or determinism. For purposes of some later comparisons, we can briefly cite Spinoza, Kant, and the "reconciliationists" as illustrative of those philosophers who tackled the issue of freedom in relation to causal necessity.

　　 Spinoza's interest in freedom was paramount, for "freedom of mind" was precisely what would lead to the "continuous, supreme, and unending happiness' which he sought.5 Spinoza understood "causal necessity" as that which is obtained in a rationally or logically ordered world. The structure of such a world assumed a deterministic outlook, with God as the cause qua single substance expressing his infinite being throughout nature.

　　 According to Spinoza, since it is impossible for us, in our finite mode of being, to trace an ultimate cause in the temporary contingent sequences of events, freedom of mind must be sought by tracing the logical or rational connections that are exemplified in nature. In this sense, freedom of mind may be conceived of as an attempt to approximate the understanding of God. Therefore, freedom was understood to lie in the active participation of reason, its opposite being "the mind's passive reception of idea impressed upon it from without."6 Consequently for Spinoza, who held to a parallelism between the mind and the body and further who thought emotions to be a confused idea, a step to freedom of mind consists, first of all, of formulating a clear and distinct idea of this confused idea of one's body. Once this is carried out, which allegedly results in the elimination of (evil) emotions, such a person is said to "love God and so much more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions."7 That the elimination of (passive) emotions leads a person to love God is based on Spinoza's assumption that "this love is associated with ail the modifications of the body."8 Furthermore, he maintained that "this love toward God is the highest good."9 A modality of the mind capable of attaining this love of God, the third kind of knowledge in Spinoza's terminology, is of the nature of intuitive understanding. Through this understanding arises the love of God, "accompanied by the idea of God as [its] cause." 10 This is what Spinoza calls "the intellectual love of God," which is "our salvation, or blessedness or freedom." '' As we shall subsequently show, however, this preoccupation with reason and intellectual understanding may be unnecessarily restrictive.