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As we attempt to contrast Zeami's theory of freedom, as reconstructed through our analysis, with those of Western theories briefly outlined at the beginning of this article, the following features stand out most conspicuously.

These Western theories, except Spinoza's, are construed by accepting freedom (of will) as a given experiential fact. This is the case only if we presuppose an existential as well as axiological ambiguity that exists between the mind and the body in the field of our everyday experience. On the other hand, Zeami's theory is construed as the appropriation of the non-everyday mode of experience through the process of imitation. Consequently, freedom thus revealed is an achieved quality of a person, its qualitative dimension being recognized first in the performing techniques and subsequently in the inner state of mind. This is because Zeami's sense of freedom is disclosed through the training which functions as an alteration of the bodily modalities in the progressive ascending movement of appropriation qua imitation. This ascending movement parallels approximately the manner in which Spinoza's freedom of mind as "the intellectual love of God" is envisioned, for it is said to be attained after eliminating various modifications of the body, which is a "confused" idea. However, for Spinoza, the manner of reaching "the intellectual love of God" is carried out through tracing the rational connections
　

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that obtain in the order of existence by means of "intuitive understanding." I might further note that Spinoza arrives at the freedom of mind at the expense of freedom of action, for he clearly subordinates the body to that of the rational, intuitive mind.

Theories of freedom which are based upon an intellectual reflection on freedom as a given experiential fact have analyzed the phenomenon in terms of an either/or attitude. This is most prominently articulated in Aristotle's distinction between the "voluntary" and the "involuntary." The reconciliationist's position is also worked out within the same framework, for its problematic is to dissolve a conflict of either "a man is free" or "he is determined." With Kant's two orders of causality, this either/or attitude is most clearly apparent, for the distinction between "the intelligible" and "the sensible" causalities is an ad hoc affair made in order to save freedom of will as a "power of beginning a state spontaneously^ In sharp contrast to this methodological approach via intellectual reflection, Zeami's notion of freedom is disclosed by the subjecting of the intellectual aspect of a person to a "practical epoché." In so doing, according to Zeami, a person achieves freedom of action and that of mind in proportion to the degree he appropriates various modalities of his body, that is, performing techniques. This accounts for the fact that Zeami's notion of freedom admits of degrees of expressing and embodying freedom of action, as well as an inner state of mind.

These "degrees of freedom" result from the fact that Zeami recognized a multidimensional structure of human experience. I have briefly indicated this when I dealt with the transformation from the everyday mode of experience to the non-everyday mode of experience in reference to the degree of achievements in training qua imitation. Unlike Zeami's multidimensional structure of experience, theories of freedom, with the possible exception of Kant and Spinoza, have been formulated along a one-dimensional plane. When this one-dimensional plane of experience as the locus of the problem of freedom is combined with intellectual reflection as the proper tool to define freedom, it would seem inevitable to conceive of freedom in terms other than an either/or proposition.

Under Aristotle's analysis, Zeami's notion of freedom cannot be sustained, for the process of appropriation qua imitation in Zeami's conception of training is a "moving principle" that is outside of an agent. According to Aristotle, this is a "compulsory" action, for the process of appropriation qua imitation in Zeami, as we have seen, is a prescription of fashioning one's body in a regulated sequence of "forms." Kant's effort to place freedom of will outside of the sensible causal series is similar in spirit, that is, to place the "intelligible" cause of an agent outside of the "prescription" (or necessity) of the causal series. In this sense, Zeami's theory of freedom is comparable in spirit to the reconciliationist's position which sees a logical connection between freedom of will and determinism. Freedom, according to Zeami, is achieved
　

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through the prescription that is imposed upon one's body. Appropriation qua imitation is a necessary condition for actualizing freedom. Upon closer scrutiny, however, determinism, with which the reconciliationist is concerned, is different from the prescription operative in Zeami's theory, for the notion of determinism for the reconciliationist is taken to be diametrically opposed to the notion of freedom of the will which is operative in the field of our everyday experience. Hence, it is operative on the same horizontal plane as freedom of the will. Zeami's prescription, on the other hand, is a process imposed upon the progressive ascending movement that takes the field of everyday experience. wherein both freedom of the will and determinism in the reconciliationist's sense are operative, as its point of departure. Moreover, Zeami's conception of prescription, discernible in his notion of "imitation," is far from Spinoza's rational necessity, since Zeami's notion of "imitation" has nothing whatsoever to do with rationality. We remember that the training is the fashioning of one's body into "forms."