Why not respond to them and make use of them?
Instead of letting things multiply by themselves,
Why not exercise your ability to transform [and increase] them?
Instead of thinking about things as things,
Why not attend to them so you won't lose them?
Instead of admiring how things come into being,
Why not do something to bring them to full development? [15]

Chan comments that "nowhere else in the history of Chinese thought is the idea of confronting nature so definite and so strong. It is a pity that this did not lead to a development of natural science." Chan expresses disappointment that the Han Chinese did not follow through with Xunzi's program for applied science, and he blames this failure on orthodox Confucians and Taoists who overemphasized the harmony between human beings and nature. In the context of the current study, a very different response suggests itself. In this text we seem to have a recipe for technological domination and control, even (in lines 5-6) a plan for climate control and (in lines 7-8) a premonition of genetic manipulation of biological species. An alternative judgment is that the Han leaders were wise to reject what modern commentators have categorized as Xunzi's utilitarianism and incipient technologism.

　　 I began by praising Xunzi's insights about the relationship of

 

 

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humans, Heaven, and Earth. My thesis is that such a cosmology should be superior to other world-views in which human beings have exercised over-reaching self-aggrandizement at the expense of nature and the spiritual. Confucian cosmology should then serve as an effective antidote to Titanism. Could it be that Xunzi's alleged naturalism is too excessive and upsets the balance of the cosmic triad, such that there is insufficient respect for the integrity of Heaven and Earth? With Machle's perspective now in place, this definitely cannot, be the reason. Furthermore, the neo-Confucians naturalize Heaven more thoroughly and consistently than Xunzi does, even with the traditional interpretation of his naturalism.

　　 Is it then due to Xunzi's view that human nature is originally evil? I entertain this hypothesis only because commentators have said that the rise of technology in the West has gone hand-in-hand with a Calvinist doctrine of human depravity. But we all know that it is simply wrong to cast Xunzi as a Confucian Calvinist. Although he disagrees about original human nature, he is just as confident as Mencius about the capacity for people to establish virtue on their own power. Not only is he just as confident, some recent commentators believe that his theory of human virtue is more philosophically sound than Mencius'. [16]

　　 Perhaps the clue to why Xunzi may be a prototechnologist can be found in his concept of xin. Usually translated as "heart/mind" or simply "heart" in D. C. Lau's translation of the Mencius. Xunzi's xin is more properly translated as "mind" in the western sense. In the West, when heart and mind are separated, the latter tends to become a calculating, objectifying, even manipulative, faculty. Xunzi speaks often of xin as the "ruler" of the body and how it is to produce order where Tian is unable to. Furthermore, Xunzi's approach to the rectification of names is almost exclusively logical, rather than social and moral, and this focus may again be attributed to his concept of xin.

　　 But it cannot be Xunzi's concept of mind which leads him astray, because even Mencius warns us that if the mind is not in control, then the senses may well distract us from virtue (Mencius 6a15). Furthermore, many neo-Confucians separate the cognitive and affective parts of the

 

 

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soul just as much as Xunzi does, but yet they generally maintain a balanced view of the cosmic triad and do not recommend the exploitation of nature. But even with some separation of mind, feelings, and senses, we must remind ourselves that Confucian philosophy never entertained a complete subject/object split, the egocentric predicament, and the serious problems associated with these western developments. [17]

　　 Some might say that the solution to the problem lies in Xunzi's relation to Mencius. By rejecting the Mencian view that Heaven is in every one of us, Xunzi literally cuts the heart out of Confucian philosophy. The result is that he is unable to express the essential interrelation of the partners of the cosmic triad. Just as important as the integrity of each is the holistic view of their interpenetration, a pervasive theme, as we shall see, in neo-Confucianism. On this view, Heaven and Earth, for Xunzi, are not internally, but externally related to one another and to human beings. This would explain why in the passage above both Heaven and Earth are seen to be primarily objects for human use. Thomé H. Fang is a supporter of this view:

Xunzi was the only one who seemed to be "fed up" with the value-centric conception of Heaven. Just for this reason, he wanted to set up the supremacy of man apart from unnecessary complication with Nature, which is nothing more than a neutral order with physical energies in store for human utilization. [18]