Ames and Hall's use of the Doctrine of the Mean is also problematic. They quote the famous passage: "So earnest and sincere -- he is humanity! How deep and unfathomable -- he is abyss! How vast and great -- he is Heaven (tian). Who can know him except he who really has quickness of apprehension, intelligence, sageliness, and wisdom, and understands (the) character of Heaven?" [36] Ames and Hall's interpretation goes wrong for at least two reasons: (1) they ignore the obviously figurative nature of this passage; and (2) they do not read the passage in its own context or the context of traditional and contemporary commentary. The immediate context, the preceding section and especially the sentence following the crucial one, indicates that the sage has human qualities not divine attributes. More importantly, the passage is obviously figurative. Just as we are not to believe that the sage is actually an abyss -- he is only "deep and unfathomable" as an abyss -- we are not to think that the sage is literally Heaven.
Tu Wei-ming, even though cited favorably by Ames and Hall, offers t less monistic, less pantheistic view of the cosmic triad of Heaven, Earth, and human beings. For Tu human beings constitute a trinity with Heaven and Earth, in which they "form a coincidence with Heaven," but they maintain a "conceptual separation" within "an unbreakable organismic
p. 145
continuum." [37] I believe that Tu has the correct view of the cosmic triad. "Coincidence" and "conceptual separation" clearly do not indicate identity of any kind. Ames and Hall ever quote Tu's warning that the Doctrine of the Mean "does not mean to suggest that Confucius is, in a sense, being 'deified.'" [38] Nevertheless, Ames and Hall, going against the texts and the tradition, claim that "the fact is, however, that Confucius is deified, or rather deifies himself." [39] Ironically, Ames and Hall fight gallantly against the Christian idea of transcendence all throughout their book; but then, by raising the issue of deification, which makes sense only within a view of divine transcendence, they undercut their otherwise innovative reinterpretation of Confucius.
Machle's brilliant rereading of Xunzi is also marred by his view that the sage is a supernatural being. "The sages may thus justly be considered gods -- and greater gods than most, since a sage is 'equal to Tian and Earth.'" [40] Machle claims that "such an apotheosis of human into godhead is, of course, no great problem for Chinese culture," [41] but my own research has revealed that there was a general waxing and waning of the elevation of Confucius and the other sages. Most important, however, is that the philosophers themselves, except for Kang Youwei, Chen Huan Chang, and Yen Fu early in this century, resisted the deification of Confucius. Not one of the medieval Confucian scholars, for example, supported such a notion. Buddhist and Christian philosophers appeared to have no problem with the deification of their respective figures, but Confucian philosophers obviously did. On this issue especially it is important to keep Chinese popular culture and religion separate from Confucian philosophy.
Machle shows that previous commentators have underplayed the use of the words shen and shenming in the text of the Xunzi. The shen or divinity of Tian is shown only indirectly in the cycles of the heavens and the seasons. As the Xunzi states: "It is to be called shen because though we do not see its workings, we see its effectiveness." [42] Machle is again able to distinguish between Tian and nature: the former is the invisible spiritual force behind nature. As there is no plural in Chinese, shen can
p. 146
be seen as both the singular divinity Tian and the plurality of its spiritual effects. "Not seeing the actual workings, we see the effects, and for this reason [the agents] are properly called spirit (shen)." [43] But surely we are not to call these spiritual effects either God or gods. If we are to use the word "God," we should reserve it exclusively for Tian, which according to Machle is at the "top of the cosmic hierarchy, as perfect yang and as preeminent shen." [44]
As in the Hebrew uses of ruah (spirit) and nephesh (lit. "breath"), the Chinese soul can also be called shen, this time "human spirit" not a divine being. (Machle correctly relates this usage to the Greek psyche.) Therefore, Xunzi has no problem celebrating departed shen, but he does reject superstitions about ghosts (gui). One could say, contrary to the received views, that Xunzi is less agnostic than Confucius about both Tian and spiritual things. But it is clear that in stating that the natural effects of Tian, including the actions of the sage, are shen, Xunzi is in no way saying that there are divine beings. This conclusion is consistent with Machle's insistence, in dispute with Robert Eno, [45] that Tian and the sage kings must be seen as distinct beings (This criticism also applies to Ames' and Hall's monistic tendencies to identify or merge Tian and the sage.)