P.449

　　   Most papers published  by Western scholars of Indian
　　   philosophy  have, until now, been largely exegetical
　　   in  nature.  This  is  for  very  good  reasons.  An
　　   enormous  amount  of material  has needed (and still
　　   needs)  to  be  made  available   to  the  scholarly
　　   community by way of translation and commentary.  But
　　   perhaps  there  is  also  room,  and  need, for  the
　　   occasional   feuilleton   like   this,  an  avowedly
　　   polemical　　 piece   attempting　　 to   follow   the
　　   philosophical  implications of a particular argument
　　   or  set  of definitions  to  a conclusion  that  its
　　   authors  might not have wished to accept.  There is,
　　   after  all, a long  and honorable  tradition  of the
　　   application  of this  method  in Indian  (especially
　　   Buddhist) polemical  literature: what  else  is  the
　　   prasa^nga? The positive  results of such an approach
　　   to Indian  philosophy  might  be that  the positions
　　   argued  for  in the texts  are  taken  with  greater
　　   philosophical   seriousness   than   the  exegetical
　　   approach  allows, and that some of their entailments
　　   might  be more clearly  seen than is at present  the
　　   case.  Such, in a particular small instance, are the
　　   goals of the present piece.  The argument given here
　　   is presented  not  with  the  assurance  that  it is
　　   either valid or sound (though  naturally  I think it
　　   to be both), but rather  with the hope that it might
　　   lead to further discussion.

　　　　  The standard  Buddhist account of memory employs
　　   two technical terms--sm.rti and pratyabhij~naana. In
　　   this context, for reasons that will become apparent,
　　   I shall  translate  the former  as 're-presentation'
　　   (in  the sense  of presenting  again  what  has been
　　   presented  before), and the latter as 'recognition'.
　　   The former  will denote the reappearance  in a given
　　   mental  continuum  (cittasa.mtaana) of the  complete
　　   experiential   content  of  a  preceding  moment  or
　　   moments of experience.  Examples: I hear again music
　　   I heard twenty years ago; I see again the buttons on
　　   a coat my mother used to wear when I was a child;  I
　　   touch again my first lover's lips.  In all cases the
　　   re-presentation   (sm.rti)  is   of   the   complete
　　   experiential  content  of the  original  experience.
　　   Recognition  (pratyabhij~naana) denotes  a conscious