previous moment of experience  and a recognition  to
　　   judge that this has indeed  occurred.  If we add the
　　   straightforward   (and  pan-Buddhist)  premise  that
　　   every  instance  of  experience   belonging  to  all
　　   non-Buddhas  is tainted  with  passions  of  various
　　   sorts, especially  egocentricity (asmimaana) and its
　　   concomitants   (raaga,  dve.sa,  moha) ,  then   the
　　   following argument is easy to construct:

　　   (1) An instance  of re-presentation  (smara.nacitta)
　　　　  represents  to its subject  the full experienced
　　　　  content of a past moment of experience.

　　   (2) An　　   instance　　　　 of　　   recognition
　　　　  (pratyabhij~naanacitta) is  a judgment  that  an
　　　　  immediately   preceding   mental   event  was  a
　　　　  re-presentation.

　　   (3) All   moments   of   experience   belonging   to
　　　　  non-Buddhas have some passions as constituents.

　　   (4) All  moments  of  experience  belonging  to  all
　　　　  Buddhas are entirely free from passions.

　　   (5) All Buddhas make only true judgments.

　　   (6) No  Buddha   can  experience   an  instance   of
　　　　  re-presentation  that  re-presents  a moment  of
　　　　  experience  belonging to a non-Buddha [from (1),
　　　　  (3), and (4)].

　　   (7) No  Buddha   can  recognize   that  he  has  had
　　　　  re-presented  to  him  a  moment  of  experience
　　　　  belonging  to a non-Buddha  [from  (2), (5), and
　　　　  (6)].

　　   To  restate:  Buddhas   can  neither  experience   a
　　   re-presentation  of any moment of experience  in any
　　   past life (when they were not Buddhas), nor can they
　　   judge   that   they   have   so   experienced.   So:
　　   buddhaanaa.m puurvanivaasaanusm.rti.h puurvanivaa-
　　   sapratyabhij~naana.m ca na yujyete. Buddhas cannot
　　   remember their previous lives. Quod erut demonstrandum,
　　   or, if you prefer, siddham etat.

　　　　　　　　　　　　  P.451

　　　　  This argument  can be challenged, I think.  from
　　   two perspectives.  First, exegetically, it could  be
　　   claimed  that I have misrepresented  what  Buddhists
　　   have typically  meant in such contexts  as these  by
　　   sm.rti  and pratyabhij~naana, and that premises  (1)