Finally, a brief comment on what Buddhas can
have if they cannot have memory of their previous
lives. They can have propositional knowledge of the
truth of large (perhaps infinitely large) sets of
propositions of the form experiential event E1 is
causally related to experiential event E in such a
way that it is proper to say that E1 is a
re-presentation of E. But knowledge of propositions
is, phenomenologically, very far from sm.rti (and
memory).
NOTES
1. This is the burden of the account given by
Vasubandhu in the ninth chapter of the
Abhidharmako`sabhaa.sya: yadi tarhi sarvathaapi
naasty aatmaa katha.m k.sa.nike.su citte.su
ciraanubhuutasyaarthasya smara.na.m bhavati
pratyabhij~naana.m vaa/sm.rtivi.sayasa.mj~naanvayaac
cittavi`se.saat/kiidr`saac cittavi`se.saat yato
'nantara.m sm.rtir bhavati/ tadaabhogasad.r-
`sasambandhisa.mj~naadim ato `nupahataprabhaavaad
aa`srayavi`se.sa`sokavyaak.sepaadibhi.h/ taad.r`so
'pi hy atadanvaya`s cittavi`se.so na samarthas taa.m
sm.rti.m bhaavayitu.m tadanvayo 'pi caanyaad.r`so na
samarthas taa.m sm.rti.m bhaavayitum/ ubhayathaa tu
samartha ity eva.m sm.rtir bhavati anyasya
saamarthyaadar`sanaat (Abhidharmako`sa and Bhaa.sya
of AAcaarya Vasubandhu with Sphuutaarthaa Commentary
of AAcaarya Ya`somitra, ed. Dwaarikaadaas `Saastrii
(Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1981), pp. 1215-1216).
2. Ya`somitra, in his commentary
(Abhidharmako`savyaakhyaa) on the rather unhelpful
smara.naad eva ca pratyabhij~naanam from the
Abhidharmako`sabhaa.sya, says: tad eveda.m yan mayaa
d.r.s.tam iti smara.naat (ed. cit., p. 1217).