acknowledgment  on the part  of the subject  that an
　　   experience  she has just had was in fact an instance
　　   of representation. So, for example, I acknowledge to
　　   myself  that the music  I just heard  with my mind's
　　   ear  was  a  re-presentation   of  the  version   of
　　   Beethoven's  Seventh  Symphony  that I heard  in the
　　   Roval Albert Hall when I was fifteen. And so forth.

　　　　  Buddhist  texts  typically  say that  there  are
　　   three  severally  necessary  and jointly  sufficient
　　   conditions that a given mental event must fulfill if
　　   it   is  to  be  classified   as  an   instance   of
　　   re-presentation,  a  smara.nacitta.  First, it  must
　　   have as its object something previously  experienced
　　   (puurvaanubhuutaartha) and must

　　　　　　　　　　　　  P.450

　　   re-present  that object in the sense given.  Second,
　　   it must be connected  causally  with that previously
　　   experienced  object.  And third, the mental event in
　　   which the original  object was experienced  and that
　　   in which it is re-presented must be part of the same
　　   mental  continuum  (ekasa.mtaanika).(1)

　　　　  Recognition then follows from re-presentation by
　　   way of a conceptualized (and perhaps even vocalized)
　　   judgment  that (iti) the experience  in question was
　　   an instance  of sm.rti.(2) Here we approach close to
　　   the heart of the argument: what kind of judgment  is
　　   at  issue  here? Typically,  it  is  said  to  be  a
　　   judgment of the form I saw this. Buddhist metaphysics
　　   requires that when and if Buddhas make judgments  of
　　   this kind, they do so only to speak with the vulgar.
　　   They do not really  mean it, or at least they do not
　　   mean it in the sense  in which  a p.rthagjana  would
　　   mean it, for they know that the personal pronoun has
　　   no referent, or, more precisely, that it refers only
　　   to the aggregates (skandha).  So Buddhas cannot have
　　   recognition in the exact sense in which that term is
　　   usually  interpreted  in  the  texts.  They  may, of
　　   course,   be   able   to   make   other   sorts   of
　　   judgments--for  example, the mental  event  thatjust
　　   occurred was a re-presentation  in the sense that it
　　   occurred in the same continuum  as did that event of
　　   which  it was a re-presentation--and  so be able  to
　　   preserve  their ability to have (a somewhat modified
　　   kind of) recognition.

　　　　  But there are deeper problems. A re-presentation
　　   is supposed  to re-present  the  full  content  of a