【中文摘要】本论文系依据月称所着之《入中论》对唯识学派阿赖耶识缘起的批判，从佛教缘起思想的历史脉络、月称对“缘起”的语义解释及中观应成派的方法，以探讨月称的缘起思想。月称在《入中论》中，主要是基于“缘起无自性”的立场批判唯识论者的有“自性”（svabhava）之缘起论，并且在《明句论》中将“缘起”解释作“相待”（apeksa），亦即缘起诸法之所以无自性，乃是由于因缘所生的一切法无不是相依相待，相待故无自性；换言之，月称乃系以缘起的“相待性”意义，批判唯识学派的有自性之缘起论。月称除了以“相待性”作为缘起的语义，并且将“相待性”融会于“此缘性”(idajpratyayata）与“空性”（wunyata）。因此，月称对缘起的理解，即包含有此缘性、相待性及空寂性等三方面之概念。月称对唯识学派的批判，乃是以上述“缘起”一词所包含的三方面概念作为批判基础，以批判唯识学派“计阿赖耶识以成立业果”、“唯识无境”及“依他起有自性”之主张，并在佛教缘起思想的历史脉络下，呈显出其缘起思想涵盖了“业感缘起”、“相待缘起”及“性空缘起”等三层意义。在方法学上，本文从教证和理证等二方面，分别探讨唯识学派赖耶缘起及月称的缘起思想之论证方法，并藉由中观应成派不共自续派和唯识派的论理特色，呈显应成派的归谬论证法及月称的论证逻辑，并提出月称对唯识学派的批判之检讨。本文最后，仍依循佛教缘起思想的历史脉络，以探讨月称的缘起思想乃系上承释尊和龙树的人法二空之缘起论，下开西藏中观学之蓬勃发展，以呈显月称缘起思想在佛教史上所具有的承先启后之意义；并从月称解释“世俗”（sajvrti）之三义及其缘起思想所包含的二谛义，对月称的缘起思想作出评价。

【英文摘要】The present thesis investigates Candrakirti''''s concept of dependent-arising on the basis of the critique, given in his Madhyamakavatara, regarding the Yogacara concept of “dependent-arising regarding the mind-basis-of-all”. The approaches taken are Buddhist intellectual history in general, Candrakirti''''s interpretation of the term “pratityasamutpada”, and the methodology of the Prasavgika-Madhyamika. In the Madhyamakavatara, Candrakirti criticized the vijbanavadin theory of “dependent- arising regarding self-existence” mainly on the basis of his view that “dependent- arising is without self-existence” while in the Prasannapada he interpreted the term “pratitya” as “apeksa” (relativity), i.e the reason for conditioned phenomena to be without self-existence lies in the fact that every dharma arisen by causes and conditions is dependent and therefore empty of self-existence. In other words, Candrakirti criticized the Yogacara theory of “dependent-arising regarding self- existence” in view of his understanding of the “relativity” of dependent-arising. For Candrakirti, “apeksa” does not only indicate the meaning of “pratitya”, but it is also in harmony with “idajpratyayata” (conditionality) and “wunyata” (emptiness). Thus Candrakirti''''s understanding of dependent-arising comprises the three aspects of “relativity,” “conditionality,” and “emptiness”. His criticism of the Yogacara, therefore, is based on the above-mentioned threefold meaning of dependent-arising and attacked the Yogacara positions that “a connection of action-cause with action-effect depends on the mind-basis-of-all,” “mind-only is without object” and “other powered dependent phenomena possess self-existence”. This demonstrates that Candrakirti''''s concept of dependent-arising included the ideas of “dependent-arising regarding action-capability,” “dependent-arising regarding relativity,” and“dependent- arising regarding emptiness”. The present thesis, moreover, discusses the logic behind the Yogacara concept of “dependent-arising regarding the mind-basis-of-all” and Candrakirtis ideas concerning dependent-arising by way of teaching-argument and reason-argument. Through the specific arguments which differentiate Prasavgika- Madhyamika from Svatantrika and Yogacara, the Prasavgika method of prasavga- anumana and Candrakirti''''s logic of argument are demonstrated. Then an evaluation of Candrakirti''''s criticism of the Yogacara is given. In view of the development of the Buddhist concept of dependent-arising, it is believed that Candrakirti''''s understanding derived from the theory of personal selflessness and phenomenal selflessness as expounded by Wakyamuni and Nagarjuna, and in turn made the vigorous development of Madhyamika studies in the Tibetan tradition possible. Finally, an attempt is made to appreciate Candrakirti''''s concept of dependent-arising from the viewpoint of the two truths and the three kinds of meaning of “sajvrti” (convention) as they were interpreted by Candrakirti.

【论文目次】

目录
感言
摘要 i
略语表 iii
第一章 绪论
第一节 研究动机与目的 1
第二节 前人研究成果与本文研究价值 4
第三节 研究方法与资料 6
第四节 全文结构述要 9
第二章 月称缘起思想的历史背景 13
第一节 月称的生平与著作 13
第二节 原始与部派佛教的缘起思想 16
第三节 中观与唯识学派的缘起思想 26
第四节 清辨与月称对唯识的批判及其方法比较 37
第三章 月称的“缘起”义 43
第一节　月称对“缘起”一词的语义解释 43
第二节 月称对“世俗谛”的解释 53
一、“世俗”三义 53
二、两种世俗之区分 63
第三节 月称对缘起与二谛的理解 72
一、缘起通世俗谛 73
二、缘起通胜义谛 77