is not entitatively distinct from the-other-as-the-child-of-me. The
empirical ego, then, as an ideal 'pole' unifying the manifold of
ego-profiles, embraces the other within itself in a strikingly intimate
way. In presenting itself to itself in a given manner, it thereby
inescapably presents the other to itself. It is only fair to point out that
the theory of the Cartesian Meditations is not Husserl's final word on the
constitution of the other. In the posthumous intersubjectivity texts
Husserl reverses his earlier disposition to consider self and other as
ontologically distinct. He there speaks of a primordial intersubjective
impulse, analogous to the sexual impulse. "A relation to the other as other
is found in the impulse per se and to its correlative impulse." [50] In its
"primal fulfillment we do not have two fulfillments that must be separated
into the one and the other primordialities, but a unity of both
primordialities which produces itself through the interpenetration of
fulfillments." [51] The unitary 'primordiality' of which Husserl here
speaks can be illustrated by that single relational entity indifferently
nuanced as 'the-self-as-the-mother-of-con' or
'the-self-as-the-child-of-me'.

If, within Vietnamese every reference to oneself within the real-world
context involves not only a reference to the interlocutor, but a belief in
his or her existence, the question of the mother's existence cannot arise
in the real-world context. Since self-reference via the English 'I' does
not, in virtue of its very logic, involve belief in the existence of the
person addressed, one is free in English (though not in Viemamese) to
entertain the possibility that solipsism might be true of the real world.
The Vietnamese child, speaking to an imaginary playmate, certainly need not
believe in this playmate's existence. But the same child, in addressing her
parents, cannot escape belief in their existence. Solipsistic doubts can
 arise, for the speaker, in the very presence of the (apparent) Other. Such
doubts can arise, for the speaker of Vietnamese only in a context other
than that of the real world. Solipsism, then, cannot be taken seriously by
the Vietnamese speaker (as such). It is not, of course, that speakers of
Vietnamese are endowed with insufficient imaginative or conceptual power.
Surely, any Vietnamese can conceive the possibility that the individual
addressed is merely fictional. But an address to the fictional other is, in
principle, an address within a fictional, not the real-world, context. Nor
are speakers of Vietnamese afflicted with a curious psychological inability
to believe that the individual presently addressed fails to exist. An
address to an individual whom one does not believe to exist, however, may
involve make-believe, role-playing, etc., but assuredly cannot take place
within the real-world context. The possibility that others might not exist
is, for the Vietnamese, both conceivable and believable (though, as it is
for the speaker of English, implausible). Yet Yet addressive employment of
a V-indexical as in 'me do not exist' cannot occur within the real-world
context. By definition, the real-world context is such that 'me do not
exist', if believed, is semantically excluded. Solipsism thus appears to be
a language-relative philosophical problem.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 NOTES

[1] An initial caveat regarding the Husserlian notion of 'constitution' is
called for here. While the etymological overtones of this term may seem
irresistible, constitution, in the phenomenological sense, is by no means
to be conceived by analogy with the construction of a house out of boards.
In its strict application, the constitution of an object through its
'profiles' signifies no more than the evident fact that a single and
selfsame object is variously presented, that its 'look' is different from
here than from there, but that one and the same object is presented
throughout the manifold of alternative 'looks'. In its strict application,
the notion of constitution is ontologically neutral.

[2] In Lispector's graphic portrayal, "'I' is merely one of the world's
instantaneous spasms". LISPECTOR, CLARICE (1988) The Passion According to
G. H., trans. Ronald W. Sousa (Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota
Press) p. 172.

[3] Dogen is clear that "There is a 'who' in beyond-thinking. That 'who'
upholds the self'. DOGEN, Shobogenzo Zazenshin, as quoted in MENZAN, ZUIHO
OSHO (1988) Jijuyu-zanmai [Same & of the self], in: SHOHAKU OKUMURA &
DAITSU TOM WRIGHT, trans. Dogen Zen (Kyoto, Kyoto Soto-Zen Center) p. 95.
Yet the response to this 'who?' can only be 'no one!' The 'who' is not a
self or ego.

[4] As Nagarjuna expresses it: "Whatever comes into existence presupposing