There is not enough room there for a bridge, a cereal box, or even for
　　 written words. Instead, we do as Strawson suggested: the subject of
　　 the display sentence is "understood"; i.e., we make a "mental word" or
　　 "mental picture" to represent it in a certain way. Thus the
　　 proposition we understand and believe when we encounter most display
　　 sentences is usually not the meaning of the displayed sentence itself,
　　 but a counterpart proposition: a proxy which includes the sense of
　　 some mental representation of the bridge, instead of the bridge
　　 itself.

ZEMACH, op. cit., note 11, p. 196. Accordingly, we should, perhaps, speak
of `I' as representing the self, not as referring to it, meaning by this
that the word `I' serves as a `proxy' bearing the sense of a mental
representation of the self.

[34] BHATTACHARYYA, K. C. (1976) Search for the Absolute in Neo-Vedanta,
George Bosworth Burch (Ed.) (Honolulu, HI, The University Press of Hawaii)
p. 159.

[35] Ibid., p. 160.

[36] Ibid., p. 162.

[37] Ibid., p. 160.

[38] Casteneda, with his doctrince of `I-guises', seems, at least prima
facie, to approximate a recognition of ego-profiles. `I', on each occasion
of its use, refers to a distinct `I-guise', an ontological constituent of
the `I' (the self) canonically designated by a definite description. Thus,
for example, Jocasta's son and Jocasta's second husband are distinct, but
`consubstantiated', guises ontologically comprising Oedipus. `I' could, on
a given occasion, refer to the father of the addressee--surely a viable
candidate for I-guise status. Or, on another occasion, `I' might refer to
the child of the addressee (yet another I-guise). Setting aside whatever
differences we might have with Casteneda's account of self-reference
(including the problem of who a self composed of such consubstantiated
I-guises might be), we might initially be tempted to identify I-guises and
ego-profiles. After all, `the father of the addressee' and
`the-self-as-your-father' seem, at the level of surface grammar, remarkably
similar. But this turns out to be illusory. `Bo, of course, is an
expression which represents the `display' of the self-as-your-father. Were
we to identify this ego-profile with its associated I-guise, `Bo would then
function, within Casteneda's scheme of things, as a name, or covert
description, denoting a given I-guise. Barring Casteneda's theory of
`consubstantiation', we seem to be faced with the dissolution of the self
into fragments. But even should such shards be consubstantiated to comprise
a single self, the resultant `self' would be the product of a peculiar
logical or ontological operation, not the principle whereby such `pieces'
of the self are gathered in attendance upon this operation. If `Bo'
`represents, as Casteneda's view itself would seem to demand, an item of
`grist' for the consubstantial `mill', then ego-profiles can be identified
which I-guises only at the cost of forfeiting the very pre-operative unity
which would deliver them from the unfortunate status of a rattling
assemblage of extensionally denotable, externally related items. If
ego-profiles are conceived as merely analytically atomic `bricks' which
lend themselves to certain manipulations, the resultant `brick wall'
patency does not possess the integral internal unity of the Husserlian
empirical ego. And, despite our tentative expectations to the contrary,
Casteneda has not, then, embraced an ontology of ego-profiles. Cf.
CASTENEDA, HECTOR-NERI (1981) The Semiotic Profile of Indexical
(Experiential) Reference, Synthese, 49, pp. 275-316; (1977) Perception,
Belief, and the Structure of Physical Objects and Consciousness, Synthese,
35, pp. 285 - 351; Cf. also ADAMS, R. M. & CASTENEDA, HECTOR-NERI (1983)
Knowledge and Self (a correspondence), in: JAMES E. TOMBERLIN (Ed.) Agent,
Language, and the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri
Casteneda, with his Replies (Cambridge, MA, Hackett) pp. 293-309.

[39] Judge William of Kierkegaard's Either/Or levels the sobering query,

　　 ... can you think of anything more frightful than that it might end
　　 with your nature being resolved into a multiplicity, that you really
　　 might become many, become like chose unhappy demonics, a legion, and
　　 you thus would have lost the inmost and holiest thing of all in a man,
　　 the unifying power of personality?

KIERKEGAARD, SOREN (1959) Either/Or, II (Princeton, NJ, Princeton
University Press), p. 163.

[40] HUSSERL, Logical Investigations, II, p. 544, n. 1. Though Sartre is
often credited as the original exponent of this thesis, it is interesting