[41] Analogously, Vietnamese uses a single word, `xanh', to refer to the
range of colour which English would denote by `green' and `blue'. Yet it is
simply untenable to suppose that, in referring to the xanh of a given
object, a Vietnamese means `either green or blue'. Disjunction does not
enter in any way into the sense that `xanh' has for the Vietnamese.
[42] In the sentence, `I'm dirty', etched in the dust on the back of a
truck by some furtive would-be calligrapher, the `I' represents, not the
tokener of `I', but the truck. Thus, of course, derives the humour of the
sentence. Moreover, if the voice-synthesiser at the local supermarket can
produce a token of `thank you for shopping with us', after tallying the
cost of groceries, there would seem to be no special difficulty in its
announcing: `I hope to see you again soon'. A significant lesson to be
drawn from illustrations such as these is that we can quite readily
understand a self-referential sentence even though there is, properly
speaking, no self to be referred to. The meaning of `I' cannot, then,
coincide with its (purported) referent. Derrida advances "A more or less
argot translation of the cogito", namely: "I am therefore dead." "This," he
tells us, "can only be written." DERRIDA, JACQUES (1986) Glas, trans. J. P.
Leavey and R. A. Rand (Lincoln, NB, University of Nebraska Press) p. 92.
Blanchot supplements: "When the Cartesian `I think, therefore I am' is
written it is, in effect, rewritten as `I think, therefore I am not' "
BLANCHOT, MAURICE (1973) Thomas the Obscure, trans. R. Lamberton (New York,
David Lewis) p. 99.
[43] HUSSERL, EDMUND (1970) Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to
Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff) p. 109.
[44] Ibid., p. 93.
[45] Ibid., p. 109.
[46] See, for example, Chapter V, Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation, in:
PAUL RICOEUR (1967) Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology (Evanston,
MI, Northwestern University Press), pp. 1 15-142.
[47] Ibid., p. 112.
[48] Ibid., p. 113.
[49] Cited from Schutz's paper, The Problem of Transcendental
Intersubjectivity in Husserl, in: ALFRED SCHUTZ, Collected Papers, III, p.
84.
[50] Husserliana, XV: pp. 593ff. Cited in LANDGREBE, LUDWIG (1977)
Phenomenology as Transcendental Theory of History, trans. Jose
Huertas-Jourda and Richard Feige in: FREDERICK A. ELLISTON & PETER
MCCORMICK (Eds) Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals (Notre Dame, IN,
University of Notre Dame Press) p. 111.
[51] Ibid.