person closest to the window will live, to the door will die, for
　　 being completely bandaged, you still do not know which of these people
　　 you are. [13]

Nor is a proper name of any avail. "Since you are suffering from amnesia
you do not remember your own name, so there is something important you
don't know yet, namely what is going to happen to you." [14] Nor, finally,
perhaps most surprisingly and most poignantly for our own present purposes,
can self-reference be accomplished by means of a demonstrative or indexical
expression. "It will not help if the doctor points you out and says `here
is what is going to happen to you'; for you won't know she pointed to you."
[15] As Nozick ruminates, "it seems we each must have a kind of access to
ourselves which is not via a term or referring expression, not via knowing
that a term holds true (of something or other)." [16] `I' cannot, then,
function as a description, name, or, crucially, as an indexical. In short,
`I' cannot function referentially. [17]

The case at issue is, of course, Husserl's insistence that the word `I' is
an `essentially occasional' expression, an indexical, referring to a given
individual in virtue of certain information embedded in the context of
utterance present on the `occasion' of its utterance. In the Logical
Investigations, the indexical, `I', is governed by a semantic rule (or
`role', as Perry would have it [18]), the latter conceived as a function
from occasional context to referent. Much later, in the Fonnal and
Transcendental Logic, we learn that the `occasion' of dialogue offers
sufficient `cues' to pin an indexical's reference to a particular
individual. The later work offers a theory of `constituting
horizon-intentionality' which `essentially determines the sense of
occasional judgments-always, and far beyond what at any time is, or can be,
said expressly and determinately in the words themselves'. [19] Indexicals
refer, of necessity, only to items within the horizon of consciousness.
Indexical reference to a given `text' is specified by features of context.
And the indexical reference to such contextual features may require, in
turn, specification by features of a more encompassing context. The final
fixation of indexical reference seems, thus, to be rooted in the
pre-articulate fringe of intelligible richness delimited by the outermost
context of conscious reference: the `world-horizon'.

The precise specification of how the indexical `I' functions attends,
however, the recognition that, for Husserl, `I' is a referring expression.
And this, we have seen, is simply unacceptable. And, again, `although a
semantic rule may determine its reference, the believer may not know this
rule or confuse it with another'. On the basis of no sentence of the form
`A am thinking', may I be said thereby to know that I am thinking. I must
know significantly more than `A am thinking' in order legitimately to infer
that I am thinking (namely, that, given the present context, `A' refers to
me). And this, quite patently, I may, for whatever reason, fail to know
 while still knowing that I am thinking.

　　　　　　　　　　 The Presentation of the Ego

Husserl finds that although self-reference is achieved by the individual
ego, its expression is universally comprehensible, and thus distinguishes
between the `universal semantic function' [20] of the indexical, `I', and
the individual to whom it refers on any particular occasion, between its
anzeigende Bedeutung and its angezeigte Bedeutung, [21] or again, as Tyler
Burge would have it, between the `sense' of the indexical and its
(linguistic) `meaning'. [22]

This segregation of the `sense' and the `reference' of `I' is, of course,
powerfully reminiscent of Frege's parallel distinction. It is not
surprising, therefore, that Husserl also echoes Frege's view that the
unique sense of `I' is utterly incommunicable. [23] The `echo', however, is
not a straightforward reproduction. For it is vital to see that, in place
of Frege's notion of the unique `sense' that `I' has for a given
individual, Husserl substitutes the notion of a unique `I-presentation':
"Each man has his own I-presentation (and with it his individual notion of
I)." [24] The language suggests that, whatever an `I-presentation' might
be, it may be accompanied by, but is not entailed by, a unique `I-sense'.
Thus, Husserl claims that the indexical, `I', "has not itself directly the
power to arouse the specific I-presentation". [25] As Mohanty speculates,
it may well be that Husserl intends, by `I-presentation', "an unvarying,
non-conceptual, inarticulate self-understanding". [26] And perhaps, indeed,
some such pre-conceptual self-understanding is precisely what Husserl means