something else is without self-existence (svabhavata)." NAGARJUNA (1967)
Fundamentals of the Middle Way: Mulamadhyamika-Karikas, in: FREDRICK J.
STRENG, trans. Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (New York, Abingdon
Press) 7:16, p. 191.

[5] CORLESS, ROGER J. (1989) The Vision of Buddhism: The Space Under the
Tree (New York, Paragon House) p. 125.

[6] Later we shall see that no expression can, in any straightforward,
literal sense, refer to oneself. As employed in this context, the
'reference' of an expression to the self is more accurately understood as
the 'representation' (or, as we shall say, 'revelation') of pre-linguistic
self-reference. In this connection, let me invoke the wisdom of Fa-yen
Wen-I (885-958) concerning reference in general:

　　 A monk asked, "As for the finger, I will not ask you about it. But
　　 what is the moon?" The Master said, "Where is the finger that you do
　　 not ask about?" So the monk asked, "As for the moon, I will not ask
　　 you about it. But what is the finger?" The Master said, "The moon!"
　　 The monk challenged him, "I asked about the finger; why should you
　　 answer me, 'the moon'?" The Master replied, "Because you asked about
　　 the finger."

CHANG CHUNG-YUAN, trans. (1971) Original Teachings of Ch'an Buddhism (New
York, Vintage) p. 242.

[7] NOZICK, ROBERT (1981) Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA,
Harvard University Press) p. 77.

[8] The hunchback, Igor, refers to himself as 'Igor'. And thus, according
to Lycan and Boer, could all of us follow suit, dropping the word 'I' from
our disparate ideolects, and replacing it with our own proper name. Cf.
BOER, S. E. & LYCAN, W. G. (1990) 'Who Me?', The Philosophical Review, 89,
pp. 427-466. The proposal, while intriguing in certain respects, is,
nonetheless, unacceptable. My own name, 'Steve', is almost embarrassingly
common. (I have, on occasion, wished that at least my name were logically
proper.) Suppose, however, that we lived in a world in which 'Steves' did
not so exuberantly proliferate. Suppose, in fact, that am the only 'Steve'.
On the Lycan-Boer account this latter supposal permits the elimination of
the word 'I' in favor of my name: Steve is (uniquely) named 'Steve'. In a
'logically perfect language', this sentence is, of course, a tautology. But
'I am (uniquely) named "Steve" ' is far from tautological-a disparity which
of itself entails a negative assessment of the Lycan-Boer proposal.

[9] In Mu-mon's report, "Old Zuigan sells out and buys himself. He is
opening a puppet show. He uses one mask to call 'Master' and another that
answers the master.... If anyone clings to any of his masks, he is
mistaken." REPS, PAZ (Ed.) (n.d.) Zen Flesh, Zen Bones: A Collection of Zen
and Pre-Zen Writings (Garden City, KA, Anchor), pp. 99-100.

[10] The compounds 'toi-doi' and 'tot-to' mean 'servant'; and 'toi-moi'
carries the additional connotation of 'slave'.

[11] ZEMACH, EDDY M. (1985) De Se and Descartes: A New Semantics for
Indexicals, Nous, 19, p. 194.

[12] NOZICK, op. cit., note 7, p. 73.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., p. 81.

[17] I am indebted to Professor William Vallicella for his very helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Vallicella formulates the
implicit assumption of this argument thus: 'I' is a referring term only if
it can be replaced salva significatione by a referring term. To negate this
assumption, however, one must assert that 'I' is a referring term and that
'I' cannot be replaced salva significatione by a referring term. Needless
to say, I reject the first conjunct. And I think there is good reason to
reject the second as well. I must say, paraphrasing Voltaire, that if a
synonym for 'I' does not exist, we shall have to invent one. Let it be 'J'.
If 'I' refers, so does 'J', and conversely. I see no reason to frown upon
this supplementation. Surely, I have not thereby shifted to a different
language (an 'English*'). Thus, 'I' can be replaced salva significatione
with 'J'. If 'I' refers (and thus, if'J' refers), it cannot be impossible
to replace 'I' by a referring expression. Of course, it might be countered
that 'J' is no more than an orthographical variant of 'I', or simply an
alternative acoustical or inscriptional realisation possessing precisely
the same meaning as 'I'. But what else could synonymy amount to? If we
replace 'I' with any expression salva significatione, surely that
expression must be a synonym. The denial of my assumption would thus seem
to entail an intriguing, but patently untenable, theory of the relationship
between meaning and realisation. If synonymy is impossible for 'I', it
would seem to be so because the inscriptional/acoustical realisation is
taken to be essential to the meaning.