[18] Cf. PERRY, JOHN (1977) Frege on Demonstratives, Philosophical Review,
86, pp. 474-497; (1979) The Problem of Essential Indexicals, Nous, 13, pp.
3-20.

[19] HUSSERL, Edmund (1969) Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion
Cairns (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff) p. 199.

[20] HUSSERL, EDMUND (1970) Logical Investigations, I, trans. J. N. Findlay
(New York, Humanities Press) p. 315.

[21] Cf. MOHANTY, J. N. (1982) Husserl and Frege (Bloomington, IN, Indiana
University Press) p. 59.

[22] Cf. BURGE, TYLER (1979) Sinning against Frege, Philosophical Review,
88, p. 398-32.

[23] Cf. PERRY, Frege on Demonstratives, op. cit., note 18.

[24] HUSSERL, op. cit., note 20, p. 316.

[25] Ibid.

[26] MOHANTY op. cit., note 21, p. 61. It may not be excessively naive to
presume a certain resonance with Mu-mon's 'true self' given poetic
expression in the following verse:

　　 You cannot describe it, you cannot picture it, You cannot admire it,
　　 you cannot sense it, It is your true self, it has nowhere to hide.
　　 When the world is destroyed, it will not be destroyed.

　　 REPS, op. cit., note 9, p. 109.

[27] Here we echo Suzuki's query: "Where is this 'I'? What does it look
like?" Suzuki, DAISETZ TEITARO (1981) The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind: The
Significance of the Sutra of Hui-Neng (Wei-Lang), Christmas Humphreys (Ed.)
(New Beach, Samuel Wiser), p. 115.

[28] ZEMACH, op. cit., note 11, p. 195.

[29] Ibid., p. 200.

[30] Rather than positing, with Husserl and with Zemach, an
extra-linguistic ego as the locus of self-reference, Merleau-Ponty,
concurring in the language-relative character of the self, rather
discloses, at the heart of consciousness, a certain ineliminable anonymity:

　　 I read, let us say, the Second Meditation. It has indeed to do with
　　 me, but a me in idea, an idea which is, strictly speaking, neither
　　 mine nor, for that matter, Descartes', but that of any reflecting man.
　　 By following the meaning of the words and the argument, I reach the
　　 conclusion that indeed because I think, I am; but this is merely a
　　 verbal cogito, for I have grasped my thought and my existence only
　　 through the medium of language, and the true formula of this cogito
　　 should be: `One thinks, therefore one is.'

MERLEAU-PONTY, MAURICE (1962) Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin
Smith (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul) p. 400.

[31] Consider, in contrast to Zemach's self-displaying thought, the
structurally similar, but phenomenologically quite different, self-feeling
thought of Merleau-Ponty: "I am not simply a constituted happening; I am
not a universal thinker [naturant]. I am a thought which recaptures itself
as already possessing an ideal of truth (which it cannot at each moment
wholly account for) and which is the horizon of its operations. This
thought, which feels itself rather than sees itself, which searches after
clarity rather than possesses it, and which creates truth rather than finds
it ..." MERLEAU-PONTY, MAURICE (1964) The Primacy of Perception (Evanston,
MI, Northwestern University Press) p. 22. In a more literary vein, Clarice
Lispector contributes: "as for myself, I have always kept one quotation
mark to my left and another to my right." LISPECTOR, op. cit., note 2, p.
23. She speaks, accordingly, of "the quotation marks that made me a
reference to myself". Ibid., p. 34.

[32] Nozick articulates a view substantially similar to that Zemach:

　　 If a nonlinguistic item can be used to refer, then, why cannot the
　　 self place itself into the blank [of, e.g. `-- is (am) tired'[, and in
　　 so doing refer to itself? The word "I" might be the marker for the
　　 blank, holding space in which the self can appear. The self would thus
　　 be part of a reflexively self-referring thought; it, not another
　　 mental item, refers to the self.

NOZICK, op. cit., note 7, p. 83.

[33] Ibid., p. 196. Zemach's `display sentence' seems akin to and may
simply coincide with what is sometimes called a `concrete proposition',
i.e. a sequence containing an object and a property attributed to that
object. To circumvent possible confusion from the outset, it is important
to distinguish the display sentence from the display proposition. In the
Zemachian view:

　　 The meaning of a sentence is a proposition. Now if the meaning of a
　　 display sentence includes such hefty items as bridges, how can we
　　 understand it? Surely we cannot take it, so to speak, into our heads: