Buddhism in the West is part of the personal cultural equipment of quite a lot of people who value it as a system of ideas and orientation, and this is an important fact in any discussion of Buddhist activism. … It is, however, something that has been appropriated and used, rather than something that has profoundly engaged the personality as in the case of the dedicated practitioner. The flavour is different. (1989: 134)

In particular, such Westerners have “appropriated and used” Buddhism in a way that reduces it to a mere socio-political tool. Hence, Jones hears these reductionists “talking in terms of personal change being necessary [merely] to facilitate fundamental social change, as if spirituality were no more than the handmaiden of truly profound and human social revolution” (1989: 124).

Later on Jones identifies such objectionable reduction and appropriation as the process of “secularization,” noting that

[w]hat is being contested is the secularization of both scriptural meaning and engaged spirituality by annexing both to contemporary social categories and perspectives confined within superficial and secular consciousness. (1989: 198)

And finally, in the following passage, Jones defines “secularization” and identifies it with what he calls “reductive modernism”:

Secularization is here the process by which spirituality is denied in a culture as well as the stripping down of formal, exoteric religion in society. As we saw … secularization also inverts and reduces spirituality to being a handmaiden and auxiliary in projects for social change, in psychotherapy and in other areas wherein a lower level of consciousness and a secular perspective prevail. … ‘Reductive modernism’ is the term used here for that movement in religion which in effect secularizes religion from within. (1989: 128-129)

So far, this argument seems valid. It does seem that the processes of secularization and the movement of reductive modernism that are aptly described by Jones do indeed occur (we will return to this in the section on Queen, et al., below). And I have no doubt that many Westerners are, to some degree, guilty of such appropriative excesses. However, we can recall from our overview above (p. 10) that when Jones speaks in terms of “the present-day interest in Buddhist activism,” he seems to imply that all modern Buddhist activists must be naïvely engaging in such secular appropriation:

[T]he present-day interest in Buddhist activism has little warranty in scripture, history[,] and tradition and is in effect a covert form of twentieth-century secularization grafted onto the traditional Dharma. (1989: 207)

Such universal condemnations would seem to insinuate that any present-day Buddhist activist who sees any signs of social engagement in Buddhism’s history is mistakenly “reading back” her own “secular” agenda (and at times, at least, whether intentionally or not, it does seem like Jones maintains such a strong stance—cf. above, p. 14). In any event, as we now turn to look at how Jones himself describes true spirituality or Buddhism (his constructed “Other”), we will see why his constructs might force him to reject the views of the vast majority of Buddhist activists.

To begin with, Jones divides religion into an “esoteric” and an “exoteric” form as follows:

The so-called esoteric part of religion is its gnostic or spiritual part. This comprises a diagnosis of the human disease and systems of psycho-physical training whereby individuals can realize their True Nature. … The exoteric part of religion comprises dogmas, moral codes, institutions, and other means for readily communicating, manifesting and sustaining religion in society. These will include some kind of economic base, charitable and educational activities, the affirmations of public worship and ritual and the exercise of political influence. (1989: 130)

Two initial points should be noted here. First, what he calls exoteric religion is not the same as what he criticizes as secularized religion. These two are entirely unrelated, and he is not interested in critiquing the exoteric part of religion. Second, he clearly states that the exoteric part of religion (to the extent to which he may think that it constitutes religion at all) already does include socially and politically engaged elements.

Next, he associates true Buddhism with the esoteric, gnostic, spiritual element of religion. Thus, he frequently makes reference to the “primary,” “existential,” “perennial,” or “epistemological” nature of Buddhism. In the following passage, he contrasts the approach of reductive modernism with that of “a Buddhist interpretation” (which he describes as being a “spiritual and root-existential” one), and he then defines the Buddhist approach as “transcendental modernism” —

‘Modern Buddhism’ can be modern in two opposed senses. It can either be the contemporary culture’s interpretation of Buddhism, and this inevitably tends to reduce Buddhism to a rational humanism (reductive modernism). Or else it can be a Buddhist interpretation of the contemporary culture, which gives us a spiritual and root-existential understanding of that culture (transcendental modernism). (1989: 271)