Here it seems fair to ask—sticking to the Buddhist case—has it ever been possible to measure the quality of life primarily in terms of the “observance” of “rites” or the “belief” in “dogmas”? As with the earlier example, the verbs “to observe” and “to believe” suggest very passive behavior, and “rites” and “dogmas” are again terms for very rigid, routinized things to which practitioners automatically adhere. Are we really to believe that this is how Buddhists have always made this measurement (until now, now that unique modern circumstances have dictated that “it is no longer possible”)?

We must equally question the implication in the above passage that Buddhists measure the quality of life exclusively in terms of an individual’s actions and beliefs. This implication is made explicit in the following passage (here with respect to the ultimate quality of life, liberation):

[I]t is no longer possible to see the individual as the sole “unit” of liberation or salvation …—… the prime beneficiary of self-cultivation—separate from the complex of roles and relationships that make up his or her life-world. (2000: 3)

Again we must ask, has this ever been possible? Would not any Individual Vehicle practitioner well educated in the basic teachings on selflessness and interdependence have found it impossible to see the “individual” as a separate “‘unit’” of anything? Certainly any Universal Vehicle practitioner well educated in Central Way philosophy (Madhyamaka) would have understood that insofar as individual selves may be said to exist, they exist not as separate units, but precisely as “complex[es] of roles and relationships”; that is, they exist conventionally, as dependent designations, as relationalities. Moreover, Universal Vehicle treatises never assert or imply that an individual self could be the “prime beneficiary” of liberation. Rather, “liberation” (which in the Universal Vehicle context necessarily entails full “enlightenment” or Buddhahood)(30) involves the full development of both a Buddha’s Truth Body as well as a Buddha’s Form Body, which provide, respectively, the complete fulfillment of both “one’s own benefit” (sva-artha, rang don) and “others’ benefit” (para-artha, gzhan don).

Indeed, whether in the ethical, philosophical, or socio-political sphere, it often seems that the “new” and modern innovations that Queen discerns as distinguishing engaged Buddhism from traditional Buddhism are little more than a reformulation of the classical differences distinguishing Universal Vehicle Buddhism from Individual Vehicle Buddhism.(31) For example, in the ethical sphere he states, “Now it is necessary to consider the effects of personal and social actions on others,” qualifying this in the philosophical sphere by saying, “‘The others’ affected by these [personal and social] actions must be understood not only as unit selves, but as significant collectivities: families, neighbors, … international populations[,] … and ecosystems” (2000: 3). These sound like traditional Universal Vehicle concerns and insights. Also in the philosophical sphere he states:

We may conclude that a profound change in Buddhist soteriology—from a highly personal and other-worldly notion of liberation to a social, economic, this-worldly liberation—distinguishes the Buddhist movements in our study. (1996: 10)

Again, it can be argued that this is precisely the “profound change” that occurred between the Individual Vehicle and Universal Vehicle articulations of liberation (we will explore this more in the next section). Finally, in the socio-political sphere he speaks of “the democratization, if not the transformation, of spiritual practices—for example, meditation and ritual initiations as now appropriated by lay practitioners” (1996: 11). Again, this is what historically occurred with Universal Vehicle (especially Vajra Vehicle) Buddhism in India and Tibet.

For now, suffice it to say that Queen understands traditional Buddhism (without reference to Vehicle) to be concerned with such “a highly personal and other-worldly notion of liberation,” and he considers modern engaged Buddhism, by contrast, to be revolutionary in its focus on liberating beings from “concrete” and “worldly” conditions. He shows that such a worldly focus has characterized Christian liberation theology, and he argues that “the worldly perspective of [Christian] liberation theologies … is fully consistent with the Buddhist liberation movements” (1996: 5).(32) This perspective is, he maintains, what defines a liberation movement as such:

It is, finally, their focus upon the relief of concrete economic, social, political, and environmental ills that qualifies these [Buddhist] movements as “liberation movements.” (1996: x-xi)