process. Thus for both the genetic process was
supreme, and was that into which all the elements of
the structural analysis had to be framed.
Both men took the world, inclusive of man, to be
nonbifurcated or, in Whiteheadian terms, to have no
disjunctive reality. Both, however, acknowledged the
fact that man is basically a bifurcating creature,
forever asserting his own individuality. And yet, as
Whitehead rightly observes, "process and
individuality require each other. In separation all
meaning evaporates."(36) For the Buddha, there is a
continuity of the becoming process by virtue of the
carry-over of the subjectivity-corporeality
(naama-ruupa) in different forms. Such forms are
relative to the contents of the five skandhas, etc.,
as they are involved in the experiential process.
Thus for both there is no room for mere personal
identity, self, mind, or ego. Whitehead, like the
Buddha, dismisses the notion of a consciousness that
is prior to experience."(37)He even goes to the extent
of saying that "mental operations do not necessarily
involve consciousness."(38)
The nonbifurcated world means that there is
interconnectedness. Here both men worked within the
monadic structure.(39) Where Whitehead introduced the
doctrine of mutual immanence of actual entities, the
Buddha also expounded on the nature of a unique
relational origination (pratiityasamutpaada) where
all experiential arisings are involved in the total
relational sense. For both there was a serious
repudiation of any "vacuous actuality."
_____________________________________
35. Process and Reality, p. 71.
36. A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1938), p. 133. In the same vein,
he says,"One main doctrine, developed in these
lectures, is that 'existence' (in any of its
senses) cannot be abstracted from 'process.' The
notions of 'process' and 'existence' presuppose
each other." Ibid., p. 131.
37. "The principle that I am adopting is that
consciousness presupposes experience, and not
experience consciousness." Process and Reality,
p. 83.
38. Ibid., p. 130.