matters of fact. When we examine the primary elements
　　   of these simplified editions, we shall find that they
　　   are in truth only to be justified  as being elaborate
　　   logical   constructions   of   a   high   degree   of
　　   abstraction.  Of  course, as  a point  of  individual
　　   psychology, we get  at the  ideas  by the  rough  and
　　   ready  method  of  suppressing   what  appear  to  be
　　   irrelevant  details.  But when we attempt  to justify
　　   this suppression of irrelevance, we find that, though
　　   there are entities left corresponding to the entities
　　   we talk  about, yet  these  entities  are  of  a high
　　   degree of abstraction.
　　　　 Thus  I hold  that  substance  and  quality  afford
　　   another   instance   of  the  fallacy   of  misplaced
　　   concreteness.(6)

　　　　 Again:

　　　　 I also express my conviction  that if we desired to
　　   obtain a more fundamental  expression of the concrete
　　   character of natural fact, the element in this scheme
　　   which  we should  first criticise  is the concept  of
　　   simple  location....  To say that a bit of matter has
　　   simple  location   means  that,  in  expressing   its
　　   spatiotemporal  relations, it  is adequate  to  state
　　   that it is where it is, in a definite  finite  region
　　   of space, and throughout  a definite  finite duration
　　   of time, apart  from any essential  reference  of the
　　   relations  of that bit of matter to other regions  of
　　   space  and to other  durations  of time.  Again, this
　　   concept  of  simple  location  is independent  of the
　　   controversy between the absolutist and the refativist
　　   views of space or of time.(7)

　　　　 When  Whitehead  made the profound  statement  that
　　   "nature  is closed  to mind," he quickly  added  that
　　   "this  closure  of nature  does not carry with it any
　　   metaphysical  doctrine  of the disjunction  of nature
　　   and  mind."(8)  Rather   than   disjunction   he  was
　　   interested   in  the  unity  and  continuity  of  the
　　   temporal   facts   in  nature.   Thus   despite   the
　　   "spatialization"  of the elements  of nature  and the
　　   corresponding  abstractions wrought from them, he was
　　   particularly concerned about how these can return, as
　　   it were, within the inclusive whole.
　　   _______________________________

　　   5. Ibid.,  pp.  11,  27.  Also, the  most  systematic
　　　　 expression   of  this  fallacy  is  presented   in