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Whitehead's `actual entity' and the Buddha&a(5)

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     where  the so-called  self  is taken  to be something
     static, structural, and thus is even looked upon as a
     lifeless   entity.   This   is  the  realm   of  pure
     abstraction or symbolism.  On the other side there is
     the  "bifurcating  self"  which, by virtue  of  being
     thought   of   in   its   nature   of  isolation   or
     independence, continues  the process of fragmentation
     or abstractive discrimination  of different realms of
     existence.  The  status  of  an  I, an ego, a subject
     aloof  from the experiential  process  in which it is
     dynamically  involved, is thereby advanced.  Thus the
     process only furthers the whole bifurcating series in
     the  continuity  of  being.   The  bifurcating   self
     necessarily  relies  on the bifurcated  self and thus
     keeps  going  the perpetual  quest for discriminative
     physical  and mental  realms and their elements.  The
     true self or anaatman  is not grasped or achieved  so
     long as this quest goes on.  It will be seen later in
     the discussion  that the Buddha admonished  those who
     indulge  in extremes  (antas) of all  kinds, for they
     are not able to experience the middle path (madhyamaa
     pratipad).

     3. A.  N.  Whitehead, Adventures  of Ideas (New York:
     Macmillan Co., 1933), p. 41.
     4. A. N. Whitehead,  Process  and  Reality (New York:
     Social Science Book Store, 1941), p.27.


              p.306

     Events  or things do not occur in a total vacuum  nor
     can they  be definitively  treated  as such.  In this
     connection  he repeatedly warned against falling into
     the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.(5) He not only
     showed what abstractions  are and how they arise but,
     more  important, focused  on the  basic  fact  of the
     coherent ontological nature of things. In Science and
     the Modern World, he clearly asserted:

     Of course, substance and quality, as well as simple
     location, are the most  natural  ideas  for the human
     mind.  It is the way in which we think of things, and
     without  these ways of thinking  we could not get our
     ideas straight for daily use. There is no doubt about
     this.  The only  question  is, How concretely  are we
     thinking   when  we  consider   nature   under  these
     conceptions? My point will be, that we are presenting
     ourselves  with  simplified   editions  of  immediate