chapters  3 and 4 of Science  and the Modern World
　　　　 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948).
　　   6.  Science  and the Modern World, pp. 76-77.
　　   7. Ibid., p. 84.
　　   8. A. N. Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Ann Arbor:
　　　　 The University of Michigan Press, 1957), p.4.

　　　　　　　　　　　　  p.307

　　   According   to  Whitehead,  this   can  be  done   by
　　   speculative philosophy. It is "the endeavour to frame
　　   a  coherent,  logical, necessary  system  of  general
　　   ideas  in  terms  of  which  every  element   of  our
　　   experience  can  be interpreted."(9) In the endeavor,
　　   he goes on to say:

　　　　 Whatever is found in 'practice' must lie within the
　　   scope  of  the  metaphysical  description.  When  the
　　   description  fails  to  include  the  'practice', the
　　   metaphysics  is  inadequate  and  requires  revision.
　　   There  can  be  no appeal  to practice  to supplement
　　   metaphysics, so long as we remain contented  with our
　　   metaphysical  doctrines.  Metaphysics  is nothing but
　　   the description  of the generalities  which apply  to
　　   all the details of practice.
　　　　 No metaphysical system can hope entirely to satisfy
　　   these pragmatic tests. At the best such a system will
　　   remain  only an approximation  to the general  truths
　　   which  are  sought.   In  particular,  there  are  no
　　   precisely stated axiomatic certainties  from which to
　　   start.  There  is not even the language  in which  to
　　   frame them.(10)

　　   Thus  philosophers   can  never   hope  to  formulate
　　   metaphysical  first principles because of weakness of
　　   insight and deficiency of language.(11) Moreover, "we
　　   can never  catch the actual  world  taking  a holiday
　　   from  their  sway."(12) The  only  alternative  is to
　　   capture these metaphysical  principles by "flashes of
　　   insight"  and develop  an "asymptotic  approach  to a
　　   scheme of principles."(l3)
　　　　 Thus  Whitehead  has made  it plain  that the world
　　   structure  in entirety  cannot be known by principles
　　   or universals, but it is not a hopeless  task to work
　　   from  the aspect  of "things  as they  are"  in their
　　   becomingness　　 to　　 the　　 greater　　 generalized
　　   characterization of those things in the "inclusive
　　   whole."(l4) In this scheme, there is the rational  as
　　   well  as  the  empirical   side,  or  there  are  the