P.281

　　   Similarities and differences between Zeno's Paradoxes
　　   and Naagaarjuna's arguments against motion in Chapter
　　   II of Muula-maadhyamika-kaarika (MMK II) have already
　　   been  remarked   by  numerous   scholars   of  Indian
　　   philosophy.  Thus  for instance  Kajiyama  refers  to
　　   certain  of Naagaarjuna's  arguments  as "Zeno--like,
　　   "(1) and  Murti  seeks  to  show  that  Naagaarjuna's
　　   dialectic  is innately superior to Zeno's.(2) In both
　　   cases  the assumption  is made that Zeno's  arguments
　　   are  specious;   the  authors   seek   to  dissociate
　　   Naagaarjuna's destructive dialectic from the taint of
　　   the best-known piece of destructive  dialectic in the
　　   Western  tradition.  On Brumbaugh's  analysis  of the
　　   four Paradoxes, however, Zeno's arguments are seen to
　　   form a coherent  whole which, as a whole, constitutes
　　   a valid argument  against  a certain  type of natural
　　   philosophy  (valid, that is, so long  as one does not
　　   accept Cantorian talk of "higher-order  infinities").
　　   The  target   of  the  Paradoxes   is  now  seen   as
　　   Pythagorean  atomism, with  its  curious-and  to  the
　　   modern mind incompatible-mixture of the principles of
　　   continuity  and  discontinuity   as  applied  to  the
　　   analysis  of space and time.  Zeno's  genius  lies in
　　   separating  out  of this  muddle  the  four  possible
　　   permutations  of  spatiotemporal  analysis, and  then
　　   constructing a paradox to show the implausibility  of
　　   each  account.  Only  on this  interpretation  of the
　　   Paradoxes  can we account  for the renown  which they
　　   enjoyed in the ancient world.(3)
　　　　  As we shall see, however, the atomisms of ancient
　　   India were strikingly  similar in several respects to
　　   the doctrines  of Pythagoreanism.  This and the clear
　　   correspondence  of  at  least  one  of  Naagaarjuna's
　　   arguments  against motion to one of Zeno's Paradoxes,
　　   lead  us  to  wonder  whether   a  new  look  at  the
　　   relationship  between the two philosophers  might not
　　   be in order.  In particular, we wonder whether, armed
　　   with the insight into atomistic  doctrines  and their
　　   refutation which Brumbaugh's analysis affords, we mig
　　   ht be able to give a more plausible interpretation of
　　   at least  some  of Naagaarjuna's  arguments  than has
　　   hitherto been possible. There is no question but that
　　   Zeno and Naagaarjuna put their respective refutations
　　   of motion to completely different uses.  The question