consists  of  an  infinite  number  of  infinitesimal
　　   points.  This notion is, of course, suggested  by the
　　   discovery of the irrationality of ?. Thus we are led
　　   to suppose  that as with the Pythagoreans, so also in
　　   India, the discovery of irrationals  led to an atomic
　　   doctrine  that  treated  space  and time  as, in some
　　   respects,  discontinuous   and,  in  other  respects,
　　   continuous.
　　　　  Our  aim is to show  that  some  of Naagaarjuna's
　　   arguments  against  motion,  like  Zeno's  Paradoxes,
　　   exploit  the atomist's  assumptions  about continuity
　　   and discontinuity  of space and time.  Before we turn
　　   to  the  direct   examination   of  these  arguments,
　　   however, we must  perform  one brief  final  task--we
　　   must indicate the point of Naagaarjuna's  dialectical
　　   refutation of motion.  I think we may safely say that
　　   Naagaarjuna's  chief  task  in MMK  is to  provide  a
　　   philosophical  rationale for the notion of 'suunyataa
　　   or  "emptiness,"   which  is  the  key  term  in  the
　　   Praj~naapaaramitaa  Suutras, the earliest  Mahaayaana
　　   literature.  What this comes  to is that he must show
　　   that  all  existents   are  "empty"   or  devoid   of
　　   self-existence.  He must perform  this task in such a
　　   way, however, as neither to propound nihilism  (which
　　   is considered  a heresy by Buddhists) nor to generate
　　   class paradoxes. To this end Naagaarjuna constructs a
　　   dialectic  which he considers capable of reducing the
　　   metaphysical   theories  of  his  opponents  (chiefly
　　   Sarvaastivaada,  Saa^mkhya,  and  Nyaaya)  either  to
　　   contradiction   or   to   a   conclusion   which   is
　　   unacceptable  to the opponent.  Unlike Zeno, however,
　　   Naagaarjuna  is not  refuting  the  theories  of  his
　　   opponents  simply  as a negative  proof  of  his  own
　　   thesis: Naagaarjuna has no thesis to defend--at least
　　   not   at   the   object-level   of   analysis   where
　　   metaphysical   theories  compete  with  one  another.
　　   Instead  his  dialectic   constitutes   a  meta-level
　　   critique of all the metaphysical  theses expounded by
　　   his   contemporaries.  One  of  Naagaarjuna's   chief
　　   techniques  is  to  exploit  the  hypostatization  or
　　   reification which invariably accompanies metaphysical
　　   speculation.  This  is to  say  that  he  is  arguing
　　   against  a strict correspondence  theory of truth and