The second "mathematical" argument (II: 3), depending
　　   on how  one  reads  it, covers  either  discontinuous
　　   space and discontinuous time (Vaidya), or continuous,
　　   infinitely  divisible  space  and discontinuous  time
　　   (Teramoto, May). Thus depending on which text of II:3
　　   is  rejected, the  corresponding  permutation  of the
　　   four  possible   analyses  will  not  be  covered  by
　　   Naagaarjuna's arguments.
　　　　  The natural philosophies  against  which Zeno and
　　   Naagaarjuna argue are surprisingly similar.  It seems
　　   likely  that  in each  case  the account  in question
　　   began as an atomism, maintaining that the universe is
　　   additive  and that  it is composed  of some  sort  of
　　   minims  or atoms;  we can then suppose  that each  of
　　   these theories  was severely  shaken by the discovery
　　   of ? and the incommensurability of the hypotenuse of
　　   a unit right triangle  with its side, which prove the
　　   impossibility  of proper minims.  However the  result
　　   of  this  discovery   was,  in  each  case,  not  the
　　   abandonment  of atomism, but an ill-fated  attempt to
　　   reconcile  that  atomism  with  the new  mathematical
　　   knowledge,  an  attempt   which  resulted   in  great
　　   confusion and inconsistency.
　　　　  Zeno and Naagaarjuna attack these muddled systems
　　   for similar reasons. Neither is constructing a system
　　   or defending  a thesis of his own;  each is, instead,
　　   attacking   his  opponents'   positions   to  provide
　　   indirect  proof  of  an  established  doctrine.   The
　　   doctrines defended are, however, completely different
　　   in kind. Zeno argues against pluralism to support the
　　   monism  of his  teacher  Parmenides, a theory  of the
　　   same type as that being rejected. Naagaarjuna, on the
　　   other hand, attacks pluralism, among other  theories,
　　   to support the doctrine of emptiness, a doctrine of a
　　   higher  logical  order than those  which  he refutes.
　　   There  is  a  further  difference   between  the  two
　　   philosophers,  in  that,  unlike   Zeno,  Naagaarjuna
　　   designs  his  refutations  as much  to elucidate  his
　　   chosen  doctrine  as  to defend  it: In  providing  a
　　   philosophical   rationale   for  "emptiness"   he  is
　　   exhibiting the true import of this term, which occurs
　　   essentially   undefined   in  the  Praj~naapaaramitaa
　　   literature.  In showing  why all  dharmas  are empty,
　　   Naagaarjuna  gives  the first truly formal account of
　　   the meaning of this doctrine.