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gone-to. This is impossible. however. since neither
of. these moments may be designated prior to the
commencement of going.
Candrakiirti's commentary on II:13 appears to
support this interpretation: "If Devadatta is
standing, having stopped here. then he does not
commence going. Of him prior to the beginning of
going there is no present-being-gone-to having its
origin in time. nor is there a gone-to where going
should be begun. Therefore from the non-existence of
gone-to and present-being-gone-to, there is no
beginning of going."(20)
A moment's reflection will show, however. that
this interpretation is not substantially different
from the "mathematical" interpretation of the
argument, particularly the second version, which made
use of infinitesimal increments of duration. Indeed
on this interpretation the argument seems specious
unless we make the additional assumption that its
target includes a ''knife-edge'' picture of time.
Thus if one assumes that time is continuous and
infinitely divisible, then at the instant (that is,
time-point) at which going actually commences, there
is in fact no real motion, since this is just the
dimensionless dividing-line between the period of
rest and the period of motion. And no matter how many
infinitesimal increments one adds to the period of
rest after it has supposedly terminated, the same
situation will prevail. Moreover, as long as one is