the action of going. that is. we locate the moment of
　　   present-being-gone-to  by defining it as that wherein
　　   the action  of going  takes  place.  So for there  is
　　   nothing objectionable in the opponent's procedure. We
　　   run into difficulties, however, when he insists  that
　　   through  this assignment  of the action  of going  to
　　   present-being-gone-to.  this moment has obtained real
　　   going.  that is. it is truly gone-to For in this case
　　   gamikriyaa, ostensibly the lak.sa.na or mark of gati.
　　   has  in fact  become  the lak.sa.na  of  gamana,  the
　　   purported   going   of   present-being-gone-to.   The
　　   attribute  action-of-going  cannot be used at once to
　　   refer  to the  real  activity  of going  and also  to
　　   designate the construct present-being-gone-to, if the
　　   result  of the latter designation  is the attribution
　　   of going-to this present moment.  Either of these two
　　   tasks--reference  to  a real  activity  of  going  or
　　   designation　　　　 of　　　　 the　　　　 construct
　　   present-being-gone-to-with-consequent-going--exhausts
　　   the function of the lak.sa.na action-of-going.
　　　　  Naagaarjuna pushes this point in II.5-6. In verse
　　   5 he notes that the thesis  of the opponent  leads to
　　   two　　 goings--that　　 by　　 which　　 there　　 is
　　   present-being-gone-to, and  that  which  is the  true
　　   going. Since the designation of present-being-gone-to
　　   as truly  gone  to has led to the  exhaustion  of the
　　   lak.sa.na   action  of-going  in  assigning  a  going
　　   whereby  the present moment is gone-to, the attribute
　　   action-of-going  is now  incapable  of imparting  its
　　   purported referent, real activity of going (gati), to
　　   the   going   (gamana)   which　　 is   assigned　　 to
　　   present-being-gone-to.   We  must  now  imagine   two
　　   goings,  one   by  which   present-being-gone-to   is
　　   purportedly  gone-to, and another  which obtains  the
　　   real attribute  of the action of going and which thus
　　   stands for the activity of going.  And as Naagaarjuna
　　   points  out  in  verse  6, the  consequence  of  this
　　   supposition  is two goers, since without a goer there
　　   can be no going.
　　　　  To those unfamiliar  with Maadhyamika  dialectic,
　　   the argument  of II:4-6 must  seem  sheer  sophistry.
　　   Here  two  things  must  be  borne  in  mind.  First,
　　   Naagaarjuna's  argument  is  aimed  at  a  historical