Na puurva^m gamanaarambhaad gamyamaana^m na vaa gata^m
　　   yatraarabhyeta gamanamagate gamana^m kuta.h.

　　   Going  is not commenced  at the gone-to, nor is going
　　　　  commenced  in the not-yet-gone-to;
　　   It  is not  begun  in  present-being-gone-to;  where,
　　　　  then. is going commenced?

　　   Present-being-gone-to  does  not exist  prior  to the
　　　　  commencement  of going, nor is there a gone-to
　　   Where going should begin; how can there be a going in
　　　　  the not-yet-gone-to?

　　   The "mathematical"  interpretation  of this  argument
　　   assumes  infinitely  divisible  time, or  a  temporal
　　   continuum. No special assumptions about the nature of
　　   space  are required, so that  space  may be taken  as
　　   either continuous or discontinuous.  The argument may
　　   thus  be taken  to correspond  in function  to either
　　   Zeno's  Arrow Paradox  or to the Paradox  of Achilles
　　   and  the Tortoise.  Assume  an individual, Devadatta,
　　   who during the interval  t[0]-t[1]  is standing  at a
　　   given location, and at some time during  the interval
　　   t[1]-t[2]  leaves  that  location.  Then assume  that
　　   there  is some  time t[x]  contained  in the interval
　　   t[1]-t[2], subsequent to which Devadatta is going. We
　　   may  now ask  when  Devadatta  commenced  to go.  The
　　   interval   t[0]-t[x]   exhaustively   describes   the
　　   duration of Devadatta's  not-going.  And the interval
　　   t[x]-t[2]  exhaustively  describes  the  duration  of
　　   Devadatta's  going for the period  that concerns  us.
　　   Then  since  (t[0]-t[x])  +  (t[x]-t[2])  covers  the
　　   entire  duration  of the  analysis, we must  conclude
　　   that at no time does Devadatta  actually commence  to
　　   go,  that  is,  at  no  time  does  the  activity  of
　　   commencing to go take place. Similarly, where i is an
　　   infinitesimal  increment  in  duration  (that  is,  a
　　   k.sana subphase), then for any n, (t[1] + n.i ) t[x]  Therefore  at no time  does  the
　　   commencement of going take place.
　　　　  The "conceptual" interpretation  of this argument
　　   goes  as follows: The  gone-to, the  not-yet-gone-to,
　　   and  present-being-gone-to, as temporal  moments, are
　　   not   naturally   occurring   existents,  but  rather
　　   conventional  entities  defined in relation to going.
　　   It is therefore  impossible  to designate these three
　　   moments  prior  to the commencement  of going.  It is
　　   impossible  to speak of going actually  taking place,