is in favor of a theory  of meaning, which takes into
　　   account  such things as coherence  and pragmatic  and
　　   contextual  considerations.  We  may  thus  say  that
　　   Naagaarjuna seeks to demonstrate the impossibility of
　　   constructing a rational speculative metaphysics.
　　　　  As one step  in this  demonstration, MMK II seeks
　　   to show  the  nonviability  of any account  of motion
　　   which makes absolute distinctions  or which assumes a
　　   correlation  between  the terms  of the analysis  and
　　   reals, that is, any analysis  which  is not tied to a
　　   specific  context  or purpose  but  is propounded  as
　　   being universally valid.  Thus once again Naagaarjuna
　　   differs from Zeno-here, in that

　　　　　　　　　　　　  p.289

　　   he is not arguing  against  the  possibility  of real
　　   motion (indeed  he argues against  rest as well), but
　　   only  against  the  possibility  of  our  giving  any
　　   coherent, universally  valid  account  of motion.  To
　　   this end he employs two different  types of argument:
　　   (a) "conceptual"  arguments, which exhibit the absurd
　　   consequences  of  any   attempt  at  mapping  meaning
　　   structures  onto  an extralinguistic  reality;  these
　　   exploit   such  things   as  the  substance-attribute
　　   relationship,  designation   and   predication;   (b)
　　   "mathematical" arguments, which exploit the anomalies
　　   which   arise  when  we  presuppose   continuous   or
　　   discontinuous  time and/or space.  Arguments  of type
　　   (a) have already received considerable attention from
　　   scholars  of  Maadhyamika;   thus  the  bulk  of  the
　　   remainder  of this article  will  focus  on arguments
　　   which we feel belong in category (b).
　　　　  It is MMK II:1 to which Kajiyama  refers  when he
　　   calls Naagaarjuna's arguments "Zeno-like." And indeed
　　   there is a clear resemblance  between this and Zeno's
　　   Arrow Paradox.

　　   Gata^m na gamyate taavadagata^m naiva gamyate
　　   gataagatavinirmukta^m gamyamaana^m na gamyate

　　   The gone-to is not gone to, nor is the not-yet-gone-to;
　　   In the  absence  of the gone-to  and  the  not-yet  -
　　   gone-to, present-being-gone-to is not gone to.

　　   The model which is under scrutiny  here is that which
　　   takes  both time and space to be continuous, that is,
　　   infinitely divisible. The argument focuses explicitly
　　   on  infinitely   divisible   space,  but   infinitely
　　   divisible time must be taken as a suppressed  premise