necessitates   the  notion  of  a  separate  apellate
　　   'going'   whereby   the  real  going   or   the  real
　　   present-being-gone-to is known.  This, in turn, gives
　　   rise  to the  problem  of the logical  interrelations
　　   among   these   various   terms.　　 The   result   is
　　   Naagaarjuna's  demonstration  that the supposition of
　　   motion  in an extended  present  leads to paradoxical
　　   consequences.  The point  we wish to make about  this
　　   demonstration is that its efficacy extends far beyond
　　   the limited  scope of Pudgalavaadin  presuppositions.
　　   Even   more  than   his  and  Zeno's   "mathematical"
　　   arguments,   Naagaarjuna's   "conceptual"   arguments
　　   against  motion are of greater than merely historical
　　   interest.
　　　　  MMK  II:7-11  seeks  to further  demonstrate  the
　　   impossibility  of motion by focusing on the notion of
　　   a goer.  In verse  7 Naagaarjuna  states  the obvious
　　   point  that  there  is  a goer  if there  is a going.
　　   Verses  8 and 9 then  convert  this, by means  of the
　　   conclusion  of II: 1-6 that  no going  occurs  in the
　　   three times, to the consequence  that there can be no
　　   goer.  MMK II:10-II then utilize essentially the same
　　   argument  as verses  4-5, but  here  apply  it to the
　　   notion of a goer:

　　   Pak.so gantaa gacchatiiti yasya tasya prasajyate
　　   gamanena vinaa gantaa gantur-gamanamicchata.h.
　　   Gamane dve prasajyate gantaa yadyuta gacchati
　　   ganteti cocyate yena gantaa san yacca gacchati

　　   The thesis is that the goer goes:from this it follows
　　   That there is a goer without a going, having obtained
　　   a going from a goer.

　　   Two goings follow if the goer goes:
　　   That by which "the goer"  is designated, and the real
　　   goer who goes.

　　   Here   again   we  see   that   the   assumption   of
　　   language-reality  isomorphism  leads  to  paradoxical
　　   consequences; in this case the analysis of the notion
　　   of a goer  leads  to two goings, one  on the side  of
　　   language, the other on the side of reality.
　　　　  MMK　　 II:12-13　　 allows　　 two　　 divergent
　　   interpretations: one  takes  it to be an argument  of
　　   the "mathematical"  type, the other to be an argument
　　   of the "conceptual" type. The verses are as follows:

　　　　　　　　　　　　  p.295

　　   Gate naarabhyate gantu^m ganta^m naarabhyate 'gate