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Zeno and Naagaarjuna on motion(25)

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      There are also important similarities between the
     two  philosophers'  styles  of argument.  Both, as we
     have  seen, are given  to the use of indirect  proof.
     Both make use of a "mathematical"  style  of argument
     which   accepts   the   opponent's   premises   and
     demonstrates  that they entail either absurdities  or
     consequences  unacceptable to the opponent.  However,
     Naagaarjuna  also makes use of a very different  sort
     of argument--one  which  approaches  the  problem  in
     question  from a meta-level, showing  the problem  as
     one   of  reification, arising  from  the  opponent's
     attempt to project his analysis out onto some


              p.298

     extralinguistic  "reality,"  and to make the terms of
     this analysis correspond  to independent  entities in
     that "reality." There are other differences  as well.
     Zeno  is  far  more  formal  and  systematic  in  his
     arguments  than is Naagaarjuna  in his "mathematical"
     arguments;  Zeno constructs  Paradoxes  to cover  all
     four  possible  cases  of  spatiotemporal  continuity
     and/or  discontinuity, whereas  Naagaarjuna  has only
     three  arguments, and these  tend to overlap.  On the
     other hand, Naagaarjuna  seems more clearly  aware of
     the nature  of his opponents'  fallacy, the confusion
     of mathematical analysis with physical occurrence and
     of mathematical fictions or conventions with physical
     entities.
      By means of their  various  arguments  concerning
     motion,  both   Zeno   and  Naagaarjuna   reach   the
     conclusion that no intelligible  account of motion is
     possible. However, the two proceed from this point of
     agreement   in  quite  different   directions.   Zeno
     concludes  that  since  no  intelligible  account  of
     motion  can be given, and  since  the  unintelligible
     cannot  exist, therefore motion itself is impossible,
     and Being must be unmoving, This supports Parmenides'
     doctrine   that   Being   is  one   and   unchanging.
     Naagaarjuna  concludes  instead that it is impossible
     to give an intelligible  account of motion because to
     do so is to attempt to make a description or analysis
     designed  to cope  with a certain  limited  practical
     problem  apply far beyond  its sphere  of competence.
     This in turn supports the thesis that metaphysics  is
     a fundamentally  misguided  undertaking.  One   could