the fourth  Truth, the Noble Truth of Path explained
　　   with  eight  members, the  first  member  is  called
　　   'right  views' (samyag-d.r.s.ti).  Sometimes  'right
　　   views'   were   established   by   determining   and
　　   eliminating  the  wrong  views.   So  in  the  Paali
　　   Sa.myutta-Nikaaya  (II,  19-21) , (30)  the  Buddha,
　　   replying to questions by Kassapa (Kaa`syapa), denied
　　   that suffering  is caused by oneself, by another, by
　　   both oneself and another, or neither  by oneself nor
　　   by another.  Then, in answer  to further  questions,
　　   the Buddha stated  that he knows suffering  and sees
　　   it.   Then  Kassapa  asked  the  Buddha  to  explain
　　   suffering  to him, and was told  that  claiming  the
　　   suffering  was done by oneself  amounts to believing
　　   that one is the same person  as before, which is the
　　   eternalistic   view;   while   claiming   that   the
　　   experiencer  of the suffering is different  from the
　　   one who caused it, amounts  to the nihilistic  view.
　　   Thereupon  the Buddha taught  the Dharma  by a mean,
　　   namely, the series  of twelve  members  which  begin
　　   with the statement  `having  nescience  as condition
　　   the motivations  arise'  and continue  with  similar
　　   statements through the rest of dependent origination
　　   (pratiitya-samutpaada) .  The  Buddha  proceeded  to
　　   teach  that  by  the  cessation  of  nescience,  the
　　   motivations  cease, and so on, with the cessation of
　　   this  entire   mass  of  suffering.   In  agreement,
　　   Naagaarjuna's Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, I, 1 states:

　　   There is no entity anywhere that arises from itself,
　　   from another, from both (itself  and another), or by
　　   chance.

　　   In  this  case  the  given  element  is  called  the
　　   'entity'  (bhaava).  The  first  two  of the  denied
　　   alternatives  have the given element  of 'cessation'
　　   (nirodha) in MK VII, 32.  The element is 'suffering'
　　   (du.hkha) or 'external entity' (baahya-bhaava) in MK
　　   XII.  The meaning of the denial here is aptly stated
　　   by Bosanquet: "Negation of a disjunction  would mean
　　   throwing  aside the whole of some definite  group of
　　   thoughts  as  fallacious, and  going  back  to begin
　　   again  with  a judgment  of the  simplest  kind.  It
　　   amounts to saying, 'None of your distinctions  touch
　　   the  point;  you  must  begin  afresh.'"(31) In  the
　　   discourse  to Kassapa, to begin  afresh  amounts  to
　　   accepting  "dependent  origination."  This  is  also