the denial," it then appears  to suit  the state  of
　　   affairs  alluded to in the passage above.  In short,
　　   the  whole  system  of four  alternatives  would  be
　　   denied  in this  contrary  negation, thus to suggest
　　   the retirement of convention (sa.mv.rti) in favor of
　　   absolute truth (paramaartha-satya).

　　　　  In  the  preceding   illustrations,  it  is  the
　　   Tathaagata  or  the  Dharma  or Nirvaa.na  which  is
　　   affirmed as the affirmation of absolute truth in the
　　   process of the

　　　　　　　　　　　　  P.13

　　   denials, because  these  denials  are  a  meditative
　　   act--and  acts succeed  where  theories  fail--which
　　   downgrades  the role of inference  and human  reason
　　   generally, and upholds the role of vision, so--as
　　   Ati`sa indicated--to promote insight (praj~naa).

　　　　  Therefore, it is now  possible  to evaluate  two
　　   interpretations which seem to be starkly contrasted:
　　   (1) Murti's "The Maadhyamika denies metaphysics  not
　　   because there is no real for him;  but because it is
　　   inaccessible to Reason.  He is convinced of a higher
　　   faculty. Intuition (praj~naa)...."(50) (2) Streng's.
　　   "In Naagaarjuna's  negative  dialectic  the power of
　　   reason is an efficient force for realizing  Ultimate
　　   Truth."(51) One could argue that the disagreement is
　　   deceptive, since  if reason  is to be  taken  as the
　　   mental   process   of  making   the  denials   which
　　   substitute  an affirmation  of the Real  or Ultimate
　　   Truth, then indeed while the Real is inaccessible to
　　   reason, it cannot  be  denied  that  reason  brought
　　   about  that  higher  faculty, the  supernal  insight
　　   (praj~naa), to which  the Real  is accessible.  This
　　   very point is made in the Kaa`syapa-parivarta:

　　   "Kaa`syapa, it is this  way: for  example, when  two
　　   trees  are rubbed  together  by the  wind, and  fire
　　   arises  (form  the  friction),  (that  fire)  having
　　   arisen, burns  the  two  trees.  In  the  same  way,
　　   Kaa`syapa, (when given  things  are analysed) by the
　　   most  pure  discrimination  (pratyavek.sa.naa),  the
　　   faculty  of noble  insight  is born; and (that Fire)
　　   having  been  born, (it) burns  up  that  most  pure
　　   discrimination itself."(52)

　　   Hence, the very discrimination  which is the kind of
　　   reasoning that denies the alternatives  is described
　　   metaphorically as a friction which arouses the fire
　　   of  insight  that  in turn  destroys  this  kind  of