consistent with Naagaarjuna's verses in the MK Thus,
in such interpretations it is not the intention of
the denial, as Staal claims, to save a principle of
human reason from default; but rather it is held
that such is really the meaning of the third
proposition, to wit, that a qualification of place,
time, or truth must be added. However, it follows
that the denials of alternatives applied to
existence, while in their explicit form constituting
the prasajya type of denial, turn out, by reason of
the qualifications added in the Maadhyamika school,
to be paryudaasa negations. Indeed, study of the two
main traditions of the Maadhyamika, Candrakiirti's
Praasa^ngika and Bhaavaviveka's Svaatantrika, will
show that both of them insist on adding
qualifications, especially in terms of the two
truths (sa.mv.rti and paramaartha) , their
disagreement stemming from how such qualifications
are made. But that a qualification should be added
is consistent with most of the attempts of
Westerners to explain the catu.sko.ti, because they
usually added something, to wit, their theory of the
catu.sko.ti. So the Maadhyamika commentators and the
Western writers share this solicitude to
rationalize, even in the case of the absolute, which
was supposed to cut off the net of qualifications.
Even so, as was indicated previously, the
Maadhyamika is not against reason as the faculty
which denies a self, denies the alternatives, and so
on, because this reason leads to the insight which
realizes the absolute.
CONCLUSION
Now we must revert to the initial question: Who
understands the four alternatives of the Buddhist
texts? It is easier to define the persons who do not
understand: as was shown, they are the ones who do
not want to understand, or are not confident of
their own ability to understand. Besides, no one
under-
P.18
stands the four alternatives, but perchance one does
understand the four alternatives in a disjunctive
system, or the four alternatives applied to
causetion, or the four alternatives applied to
existence. The four alternatives, disjunctively