(na upeti), or defined  (avyaakata).(43) Naagaarjuna
　　   devotes  Madhyamaka-kaarikaa, chap.  XXV to the same
　　   topic,  saying generally (XXV, 22): "Since all given
　　   things  (*vastu)(44) are void, what is endless, what
　　   with  end, what  both  endless  and  with  end, what
　　   neither  endless  or with end?" This  refers  to the
　　   celebrated   fourteen   'undefined   given   things'
　　   (avyaak.rta-vastuuni) .(45)  So   in  the   chapter,
　　   nirvaa.na is treated in verses 5, 8, 13, 16; and the
　　   Lord before  and after cessation, in verses  17, 18.
　　   For  example, this  is verse  17;  "One  should  not
　　   infer(40) that the Lord exists after cessation (i.e.
　　   in Nirvaa.na). One should not infer that he does not
　　   exist, or  both  (exists  and  does  not  exist), or
　　   neither."  Hence  the  rejections, again, are  aimed
　　   against all philosophical  positions  that resort to
　　   inference  or  to  ordinary  human  reason  in  such
　　   matters.(47) The  failure  of reasoning  is  clearly
　　   expressed in the Mahaayaana  work Ratnagotravibhaaga
　　   (chap.   I,  verse   9)  when   denying   the   four
　　   alternatives  about  the Dharma-sun  as the ultimate
　　   nature:

　　   I bow to that Dharma-sun  which is not existence and
　　   not   non-existence,   not   both   existence　　 and
　　   non-existence, neither different from existence  nor
　　   from  non-existence;   which   cannot   be  reasoned
　　   (a`sakyas  tarkayitum) ,  is  free  from  definition
　　   (nirukty-apagata.h), revealed by introspection, and
　　   quiescent;   and  which,  pervasively  shining  with
　　   immaculate　　 vision,   removes　　 the   attachment,
　　   antipathy, and (eye-) cauls toward all objects.(48)

　　   The  question   arises  whether   it  is  proper  to
　　   interpret  this  to involve  denial  in  Bosanquet's
　　   meaning, what he calls "contrary  negation";(49) "As
　　   we always  speak and think within a general  subject
　　   or  universe  of discourse, it  follows  that  every
　　   denial substitutes some affirmation for the judgment
　　   which it denies."  One could  argue  that simply  to
　　   deny  one  judgment   and  thereby   affirm  another
　　   judgment  would  be a process  of thinking  that  is
　　   negated  by the  goal  alluded  to in the  preceding
　　   passage, since the Dharma-sun  "cannot be reasoned."
　　   However, if Bosanquet's  statement  were altered  to
　　   read "every denial substitutes some affirmation  for