Atii`sa's classification is revealing of the
meditative use put to the denial of four
alternatives when applied to causation or to
existence. The fact, then, that his listing does not
allude to the disjunctive system of the four
alternatives that I discuss in section II, may be
simply because this system was not put to meditative
use.
The two topics of causation and existence relate
to Buddhist teachings that are essentially distinct.
Thus, in Buddhism the problem of how a Tathaagata or
Buddha arises by reason of merit and knowledge, that
is, the problem of cause, is distinct from the
problem of the existence, for example, of the
Tathaagata after death. Naturally, the causal topic
is first, since a Tathaagata has to have arisen
before there is a point to inquiring whether he
exists after death. Historically, the first topic
represents what the Buddha preferred to talk about,
and
P.4
the second topic includes matters which the Buddha
sometimes refused to talk about.
As suggested earlier, my main sources are from
Asian languages. I am also indebted to certain
Western writers, namely, Hermann Weyl for the
limitations of symbolic systems, Bernard Bosanquet
for treatment of disjunctive statements, and Willard
Van Orman Quine for his use of the word "logic"
(bibliography herein).
I. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES AND LOGIC
Jayatilleke says, "there is little evidence that
Naagaarjuna understood the logic of the four
alternatives as formulated and utilized in early
Buddhism."(3) This scholar was not content with
putting down Naagaarjuna, founder of the Maadhyamika
school, for he concludes that scarcely any Western
scholars, classical Indian scholars, or modern
Indian and Japanese writers have comprehended this
logic either. Richard H. Robinson, one of the
Western scholars whose theories on the matter were
rejected for the most part by Jayatilleke,
subsequently replied to him,(4) among other things
questioning the use of the word "logic" to refer to
the four alternatives, although himself having